Return all known malware families in the intelligence database.
Each entry includes the family name, description, and category. Use
family_threats(family_name) to retrieve the IOCs for a specific family.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description must disclose all behavioral traits. It explains the return content (family name, description, category) and implies a read-only operation, but it does not explicitly state side-effect freedom or any rate limits. This is minimal but adequate for a simple list operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences long, front-loads the core action, and efficiently adds field details and a cross-reference to a sibling tool. Every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's simplicity (0 params, existing output schema), the description covers what it returns and how to proceed to IOCs. It might have mentioned if results are ordered or limited, but for a basic list operation, it is complete enough.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, and per the rubric, baseline is 4. The description adds no parameter information (unnecessary) but also doesn't introduce any ambiguity. Schema coverage is trivially 100%.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states 'Return all known malware families in the intelligence database' with a specific verb and resource. It distinguishes itself from 'family_threats' by noting that the latter retrieves IOCs for a family, making this the listing tool.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly points to 'family_threats(family_name)' as the next step to get IOCs, providing a clear alternative for related functionality. While it doesn't list every possible alternative among siblings, it gives practical usage context for a list-then-detail pattern.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.
The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.
30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.
The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.