Return all threat signatures associated with a known malware family.
Use list_families() first to discover available family names.
Args:
family_name: Exact malware family name (e.g. "emotet", "qbot", "cobalt_strike")
limit: Max results to return (1-500). Default 50.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| family_name | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are present, so the description must carry the transparency burden. It communicates an exact-match family name semantics, result limiting, and default value, which is helpful. However, it does not disclose behavior for unknown family names, authorization requirements, or potential error conditions, leaving an edge-case gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise and well structured, with a clear one-sentence purpose, a practical prerequisite hint, and compact parameter notes. It contains no unnecessary filler or duplication.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a two-parameter tool with an output schema, the description covers the essential points: output scope, exact family naming, discovery prerequisite, and limit behavior. Return values are additionally covered by the output schema, so this is sufficiently complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema provides only types and a default, but the description adds meaningful detail: family_name must be exact and includes concrete examples, while limit is given a numeric range and default. Both parameters receive useful semantic context beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: returning all threat signatures for a known malware family. It uses a specific verb and resource, and the distinction from list_families is explicit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly instructs the agent to call list_families() first to discover valid family names, which provides clear usage context. It does not discuss exclusions or when alternative threat-lookup tools should be preferred, so it stops slightly short of full guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.
The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.
30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.
The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.