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Nullcone Threat Intelligence

check_freshness

Validate that IOC threat intelligence is fresh enough for the named action.

Call this before any high-risk agent action to ensure the TI snapshot
is not stale. The check itself completes in <1ms (no network I/O).

Action → staleness tier mapping:
  critical (≤30s):  credential_access, keychain_access, execute_shell, sudo
  high     (≤120s): load_skill, install_package, network_call, http_request
  medium   (≤300s): file_write, file_delete, registry_write, env_write
  low      (≤900s): file_read, list_directory, query_db, read_env

Args:
    action:         The action about to be executed. Unknown actions default
                    to HIGH tier (120s limit).
    block_on_stale: If True and TI is stale, return an error dict that your
                    agent should treat as a hard block. Default False (warn only).

Returns:
    action:          "allow" | "warn" | "block"
    tier:            Staleness tier for this action
    staleness_s:     Seconds since last successful sync
    max_staleness_s: Limit for this tier
    hwm:             Current high-water mark
    latency_ms:      Check latency (always <100ms)
    reason:          Human-readable explanation

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actionNoload_skill
block_on_staleNo

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully discloses behavior: the check is <1ms with no network I/O, the effect of block_on_stale (hard block vs warn), and the exact return fields. This is complete behavioral transparency beyond what any annotation could provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with sections for usage, mapping, args, and returns. Every sentence adds necessary value, and the length is justified by the absence of an output schema and annotations. Nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given no annotations and no output schema, the description provides everything needed: the staleness tier mapping, parameter semantics, and a full return field list. It is entirely self-contained and complete for the tool's complexity.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, but the description thoroughly explains both parameters: action (with a default tier for unknown actions) and block_on_stale (with default behavior and outcome). This compensates entirely for the sparse schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Description clearly states 'Validate that IOC threat intelligence is fresh enough for the named action' – a specific verb and resource. It distinguishes from siblings by focusing on TI freshness, not prompt checking or other threat operations.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides explicit timing: 'Call this before any high-risk agent action.' The action-to-tier mapping gives context for when to use. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use or name alternative tools, so it falls short of a perfect score.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.

Naming Consistency3/5

The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.

Tool Count3/5

30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.