tollbooth-authority-newengland

authority_request_npub_proof

Request npub ownership proof from a patron via Nostr DM.

This is the npub-OWNERSHIP-PROOF flow — use it when a call returns proof_required. It proves the caller controls an npub; it does NOT deliver any service secret. To hand an operator its API keys or OAuth secrets, use request_credential_channel instead.

Sends a challenge DM that the patron must sign and reply to using their Nostr client. This is a human-in-the-loop flow.

After calling this tool, STOP and tell the user to check their Nostr client and reply to the challenge. Wait for the user to confirm they have replied before calling receive_npub_proof. Do NOT poll or retry — each receive_npub_proof call destructively drains the relay mailbox.

Returns a dpop_token — the demonstrated-proof-of-possession token that the calling application MUST remember and pass as the dpop_token parameter on every subsequent paid tool call. The MCP does not retain this value across restarts.

Lifecycle: The cached proof expires after the patron's chosen duration. When it expires, call request_npub_proof again for a fresh challenge, then wait for the user, then call receive_npub_proof.

Free.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`reason`	No	Optional. A human-readable purpose for the request ("I'm working on your request XYZ and need the Operator to do ABC for you"). Signed into the provenance attestation and shown in the DM, so the recipient sees why they are being asked — especially useful when the signer is unknown to them.
`verify_at`	No	Optional. A free-form statement of WHERE you (the initiating agent) already showed this proof's one-time code to the user — a URL, or "your Claude.ai conversation", "the Grok session". The OAuth 2.0 Device Grant ``verification_uri``, generalized: the user approves only if the code in the DM matches the one you displayed there, so an unsolicited request they've never seen is refused. Signed into the attestation.
`patron_npub`	No	Required. The patron's npub to request proof from.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedJul 24, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / reason

Added value: +{
+  "default": "",
+  "description": "Optional. A human-readable purpose for the request\n(\"I'm working on your request XYZ and need the Operator to do\nABC for you\"). Signed into the provenance attestation and shown\nin the DM, so the recipient sees *why* they are being asked —\nespecially useful when the signer is unknown to them.",
+  "type": "string"
+}

addedInput schema / properties / verify_at

Added value: +{
+  "default": "",
+  "description": "Optional. A free-form statement of WHERE you (the\ninitiating agent) already showed this proof's one-time code to\nthe user — a URL, or \"your Claude.ai conversation\", \"the Grok\nsession\". The OAuth 2.0 Device Grant ``verification_uri``,\ngeneralized: the user approves only if the code in the DM matches\nthe one you displayed there, so an unsolicited request they've\nnever seen is refused. Signed into the attestation.",
+  "type": "string"
+}

First observedJul 16, 2026

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses that this is a human-in-the-loop flow requiring user interaction, that the tool returns a dpop_token that the MCP does not retain across restarts, that receive_npub_proof is destructive, and that cached proofs expire and require a fresh challenge. These are exactly the behavioral details an agent needs to use the tool safely.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is longer than average but every section earns its place: trigger, scope limitation, alternative tool, human-in-the-loop warning, stop-and-wait instruction, destructive-sibling warning, return value, persistence caveat, and lifecycle. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and uses bold headers and short paragraphs to keep the dense information scannable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with a human-in-the-loop flow, destructive sibling behavior, a persisted token requirement, and an expiry lifecycle, the description is complete. It tells the agent when to call the tool, what to do after calling it, what not to do (no polling), what the return value means, and how to handle expiration. An output schema exists, and the description appropriately explains beyond it without relying on it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The schema already documents reason, verify_at, and patron_npub in detail. The tool description does not add parameter-specific semantics beyond what the schema provides, though it does clarify related context like the return token and the stop/wait workflow. This is adequate given the schema's own thoroughness.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence states a specific verb and resource ('Request npub ownership proof from a patron via Nostr DM') and the description explicitly distinguishes this from the sibling 'request_credential_channel' by saying it does NOT deliver service secrets. It also ties the tool to a clear trigger condition ('use it when a call returns proof_required').

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives an explicit trigger ('use it when a call returns proof_required'), names the alternative for a different need ('To hand an operator its API keys or OAuth secrets, use request_credential_channel instead'), and lays out the exact workflow sequence: call, stop, wait for user, then call receive_npub_proof. It also warns against polling/retrying and explains why ('each receive_npub_proof call destructively drains the relay mailbox').

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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