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tollbooth-authority-newengland

authority_delete_patron_credential

Remove a single patron credential field.

Deletes one field from stored credentials without affecting other fields. Free. Proof of npub ownership is required — this is a write to the patron's sensitive credential vault.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
npubYesThe patron's Nostr public key (npub1...).
fieldYesThe credential field name to remove.
dpop_tokenYesRaw JSON of a kind-27235 Nostr event signed by npub — not base64, not NIP-98 'Authorization: Nostr <b64>' framing. Its `u` tag must hold THIS tool's exact name (from tools/list), not the endpoint URL; content:"", created_at within 60s of now, and a random `nonce` tag recommended. Or a cached dpop_token phrase.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / dpop_token / description
      Previous value: -"A kind-27235 Nostr event signed by npub for this tool."New value: +"Raw JSON of a kind-27235 Nostr event signed by npub —\nnot base64, not NIP-98 'Authorization: Nostr <b64>' framing. Its\n`u` tag must hold THIS tool's exact name (from tools/list), not\nthe endpoint URL; content:\"\", created_at within 60s of now, and a\nrandom `nonce` tag recommended. Or a cached dpop_token phrase."
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description correctly carries the behavioral burden. It discloses the key traits: the operation is narrowly scoped, free, requires proof of npub ownership, and is a write to a sensitve credential vault. It could go further by stating irreversibility or error behavior when the field does not exist, but it clearly surfaces the most important cautions for a destructive sensitive operation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loaded with the essential action. Every sentence earns its place: the first states what it does, the second clarifies scope, and the remaining sentences cover cost, authentication, and sensitivity. No filler or repetition exists.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive operation with no annotations, the description covers the critical context: target scope, non-destructive impact on other fields, cost, ownership proof, and the sensitive nature of the vault. The detailed schema and presence of an output schema cover the remaining invocation details, so the description is nearly complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds context that the `field` parameter refers to a single field and that other stored fields remain unaffected, which is helpful but not required. The `dpop_token` semantics are already fully and precisely documented in the schema, so the description does not need to compensate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Remove'/'Deletes'), a specific resource ('single patron credential field'), and a clear scope ('without affecting other fields'). This distinguishes it from sibling tools like authority_forget_credentials, which implies bulk removal, and authority_delete_operator_credential, which targets operator credentials.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description makes the intended use clear: delete exactly one field from a patron's stored credentials while leaving the rest intact. However, it does not explicitly contrast this with update_patron_credential, forget_credentials, or delete_operator_credential, so an agent must infer when this tool is preferred over alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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