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tollbooth-authority-newengland

authority_delete_operator_credential

Remove a single operator secret field.

Deletes one key from the operator's encrypted credential blob without touching the others — the field-level counterpart to forget_credentials, which wipes the whole row. Use it to retire a leftover after an SDK cutover (a Prefect key after Modal, or a stored but untemplated orphan like anthropic_api_key) without taking the operator down for a full re-delivery.

Stored-but-untemplated fields are first-class: the delete is keyed on what is vaulted, not on what the current template declares. Idempotent — already-absent fields report removed: false without rewriting the vault. RESTRICTED to the operator — requires proof (nsec-signed kind-27235 or a cached dpop_token phrase); patron proofs are rejected. A deletion is as destructive as a write.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
fieldYesThe operator credential field to remove (templated or not).
dpop_tokenYesOperator proof for this tool.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations exist, so the description carries full behavioral disclosure. It reveals idempotency, the `removed: false` response for absent fields, that deletion is keyed on vaulted values rather than template declarations, proof requirements, and that deletion is as destructive as a write. This is substantial and non-redundant context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: scope, use cases, idempotency, keying behavior, auth restrictions, and destructiveness. It is front-loaded with the core action and then layers necessary detail without filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's moderate complexity and the presence of an output schema, the description covers everything needed for correct invocation: purpose, use case, semantics, idempotency, auth restrictions, and destructive potential. No critical gap remains.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds meaningful semantics: `field` may be templated or untemplated and is matched against what is vaulted, while `dpop_token` is framed as operator proof rather than simply a token. This goes beyond the schema's one-line descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Remove a single operator secret field.' It then clarifies scope by naming the field-level counterpart `forget_credentials` and distinguishing it from wiping the whole row, so the agent can disambiguate it from a large sibling list.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit use-after-SDK-cutover scenarios are given, along with the contrast to `forget_credentials` for full re-delivery. It also states the operator-only restriction and rejects patron proofs, giving clear when-to and when-not-to guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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