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cypher-mcp

by io.github.lonniev

cypher_request_npub_proof

Request npub ownership proof from a patron via Nostr DM.

This is the npub-OWNERSHIP-PROOF flow — use it when a call returns proof_required. It proves the caller controls an npub; it does NOT deliver any service secret. To hand an operator its API keys or OAuth secrets, use request_credential_channel instead.

Sends a challenge DM that the patron must sign and reply to using their Nostr client. This is a human-in-the-loop flow.

After calling this tool, STOP and tell the user to check their Nostr client and reply to the challenge. Wait for the user to confirm they have replied before calling receive_npub_proof. Do NOT poll or retry — each receive_npub_proof call destructively drains the relay mailbox.

Returns a dpop_token — the demonstrated-proof-of-possession token that the calling application MUST remember and pass as the dpop_token parameter on every subsequent paid tool call. The MCP does not retain this value across restarts.

Lifecycle: The cached proof expires after the patron's chosen duration. When it expires, call request_npub_proof again for a fresh challenge, then wait for the user, then call receive_npub_proof.

Free.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
reasonNoOptional. A human-readable purpose for the request ("I'm working on your request XYZ and need the Operator to do ABC for you"). Signed into the provenance attestation and shown in the DM, so the recipient sees *why* they are being asked — especially useful when the signer is unknown to them.
verify_atNoOptional. A free-form statement of WHERE you (the initiating agent) already showed this proof's one-time code to the user — a URL, or "your Claude.ai conversation", "the Grok session". The OAuth 2.0 Device Grant ``verification_uri``, generalized: the user approves only if the code in the DM matches the one you displayed there, so an unsolicited request they've never seen is refused. Signed into the attestation.
patron_npubNoRequired. The patron's npub to request proof from.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Despite no annotations, the description discloses key behaviors: sends challenge DM, human-in-the-loop, destructive drain of relay on receive, dpop_token management, expiration, and that the proof does not deliver service secrets. No contradictions.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Well-structured with clear sections, front-loaded purpose and differentiator. Slightly verbose but every sentence adds necessary detail for a complex async flow.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers lifecycle, expected output (dpop_token), process steps, and expiration. Despite complexity, the description is complete given the presence of an output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with good descriptions. The tool description adds contextual value by explaining the reason and verify_at parameters in the flow (provenance attestation, verification URI).

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool requests an npub ownership proof via Nostr DM, distinguishes it from similar tools like request_credential_channel and receive_npub_proof, and explains what it does not do (deliver service secret).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly tells when to use (when proof_required is returned), provides alternatives (request_credential_channel), and gives step-by-step instructions including stopping, telling user, waiting, and calling receive_npub_proof. Also warns against polling and explains lifecycle.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

C2.7/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

The set is heavily clustered: audit_why_exists, explain_capability, suggest_capability_why, and authorize_capability_why all answer the same basic 'why does this capability exist?' question and differ mainly in provenance/authority. Many status and provenance tools (adoption_status, session_status, service_status, issue_provenance, pr_provenance, symbol_provenance, service_provenance) also blur together without close reading.

Naming Consistency4/5

The overwhelming majority of tools follow a predictable cypher_verb_noun pattern in snake_case, which provides strong naming consistency across a very large surface. Minor deviations such as cypher_oracle_about, cypher_oracle_how_to_join, cypher_which_service_handles, and cypher_what_realizes_capability are noticeable but do not break the overall pattern.

Tool Count1/5

112 tools is an extreme count for a single MCP server, regardless of how well the clusters are named; it heavily burdens tool selection, context, and agent discovery. The set spans unrelated domains including payments, coupons, credentials, provenance, issues, patents, queries, pricing, and NOS transformations, which should be split into separate focused servers.

Completeness4/5

Many domain clusters have strong lifeycle coverage: COUPs have mint/list/update/delete/redeem, credentials have courier delivery/box status/update/delete/forget, and the named-query catalog has full CRUD plus published-tool management. Minor gaps exist—e.g., no generic list_services, no delete for capabilities, and no close/resolve action for issues—but most flows have no outright dead end.

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