Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely useful behavior: what a result contains (titles, summaries, evidence labels, URLs), which annotations do not convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences, zero filler, with the search scope front-loaded and the return shape following. Nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description correctly steps in to describe return fields, and annotations carry the safety profile. The only gap is the undocumented include_advisories parameter and lack of routing guidance against siblings.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 50% — query, cursor and max_results are documented in the schema, but include_advisories has no description anywhere. The description's mention of advisories hints at that flag but does not explain its effect, so it only marginally compensates.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (keyword search) and resource (documented incidents and security advisories) and even enumerates the searchable facets (company, technology, CVE, failure mode). It is easily distinguished from get_incident or list_failure_patterns by its keyword-search framing, though it never names those siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance on when to search versus when to fetch a specific incident via get_incident, nor any prerequisites or exclusions. The usage context is only implied by the word 'search'.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.