Security assessment scope and evidence
describe_agentDescribe scope, evidence boundary, inputs, and outputs.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
describe_agentDescribe scope, evidence boundary, inputs, and outputs.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is covered without the description's help. The description adds that the call reports an "evidence boundary" and enumerates inputs and outputs, which hints at the nature of the content returned. It stops short of saying anything about authorization requirements, whether the answer is static or reflects current system state, or how the evidence boundary is determined.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
It is a single short sentence with no filler, and the four listed facets are front-loaded. The only cost is that the terseness shades into under-specification rather than economy. Nothing is wasted, but nothing is expanded either.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
This is a simple, zero-parameter read tool with full annotation coverage and an output schema, so the description needn't explain return values. Even so, for a tool whose entire job is to explain scope and evidence boundaries, the one-liner is thin: it does not say when to call it, what an evidence boundary means in practice, or how the output should be used in a security assessment. Barely adequate for the tool's complexity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters and the schema has an empty properties object, so there is no parameter semantics for the description to explain. Per the zero-parameter baseline, a 4 is appropriate. Nothing is missing on this dimension because there is nothing to disambiguate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a verb ("Describe") and lists four facets it covers: scope, evidence boundary, inputs, and outputs. But it never states whose scope or what object is being described, so an agent must infer from the name that it introspects the agent/assessment itself rather than the surrounding system. Purpose is implied rather than stated, which is the definition of a vague 3.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no when-to-use guidance and no mention of the sibling tools (security_preflight, get_security_receipt, scan_source, screen_injection) that an agent must choose between. It does not say whether this should be called before or after a security assessment begins, nor what a caller gains by invoking it. The reader is left to infer all routing decisions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.