Keelen

run_security_review

Find security problems in a repository: a deep, whole-codebase review.

Spawns a one-shot audit that scans the repo across a kind-aware taxonomy
(secrets + git history, vulnerable/abandoned deps, injection, SSRF, path
traversal, deserialization, crypto, info-leak, plus web authz/session/CORS,
library API-misuse, game client-trust, or infra/CI as applicable) and posts
findings to the project's Security review for human triage. You review the
findings, then send the ones worth fixing into the loop as Requests; no fix
is applied automatically. Billable; one audit in-flight per project.
(Triggering is disabled while the feature is hardened for production: a
project not on the operator allowlist — empty by default — returns a message
instead of spawning; earlier results stay visible.) Requires a paid plan;
a free or trial workspace gets a message telling the user to upgrade.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`project_id`	Yes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`result`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedAug 19, 2026

TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, the description discloses substantial behavioral detail: findings are posted for human triage, no fixes are applied automatically, triggering is disabled on non-allowlisted projects, earlier results remain visible, and free/trial workspaces receive an upgrade message. This gives the agent an accurate picture of side effects and failure modes.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with a clear summary, followed by relevant operational details. The long taxonomy list adds specificity but makes the text dense; still, every sentence contributes useful information and the structure is logical.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity, the description is unusually complete: it covers prerequisites (paid plan), concurrency limits, disabled states, billing, human triage flow, and the fact that no fix is automatic. An output schema exists, so return-value documentation is not required from the description.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema has one required parameter, project_id, with 0% description coverage. The tool description implies the parameter identifies the project/repository to audit and mentions per-project constraints, but it does not explicitly describe the format, provenance, or how to resolve a project_id. It partially compensates but leaves some ambiguity.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Find security problems in a repository: a deep, whole-codebase review.' This clearly distinguishes it from sibling review tools like run_control_gap_review and run_legal_exposure_review by naming the security scope and taxonomy.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides strong contextual guidance: it is one-shot, billable, limited to one in-flight audit per project, requires a paid plan, and may be disabled by an operator allowlist. It does not explicitly name alternative tools or state 'use X instead,' but the scope and constraints are clearly communicated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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