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Verify a scan attestation (free)

verify_attestation
Read-onlyIdempotent

Verify a Lazaretto scan attestation that another agent (or a README, or a lockfile) handed you, WITHOUT re-scanning or paying. Free and anonymous. Returns signature validity and the signed claims, including verdict, risk and subject. For a clear or flagged SHA-256 subject only, checks the current known-bad indicator set and includes contradicted when it matches. That field is otherwise omitted; its absence is not a freshness or safety verdict. Package identities are not rechecked here. A valid signature authenticates an earlier claim, not current safety. The artifact's hash or package identity must match claims.sub for the claim to apply.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "attestation": "<attestation>"
    },
    "name": "verify_attestation"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
attestationYesThe compact-JWS attestation string from a scan report.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
validYesWhether the signature verifies against Lazaretto's published keys.
claimsNo
reasonNoWhy an invalid attestation failed, for example malformed_jws.
contradictedNoPresent only when a clear or flagged SHA-256 subject now matches the known-bad indicator set. Omitted for package identities, already-malicious claims, misses and unavailable lookups; omission does not establish freshness or safety.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / properties / contradicted / description
      Previous value: -"Present when a previously clear or flagged subject is now a known-bad match, so the attestation is stale."New value: +"Present only when a clear or flagged SHA-256 subject now matches the known-bad indicator set. Omitted for package identities, already-malicious claims, misses and unavailable lookups; omission does not establish freshness or safety."
  2. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • changedOutput schema / properties / contradicted / description
      Previous value: -"True when a previously clear or flagged subject is now a known-bad match, so the attestation is stale."New value: +"Present when a previously clear or flagged subject is now a known-bad match, so the attestation is stale."
    • addedOutput schema / properties / contradicted / properties
      Added value: +{
      +  "now": {
      +    "const": "known_bad",
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "sources": {
      +    "items": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "type": "array"
      +  }
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / contradicted / required
      Added value: +[
      +  "now"
      +]
    • changedOutput schema / properties / contradicted / type
      Previous value: -"boolean"New value: +"object"
  3. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / claims / properties / analysis_partial
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Present and true when part of the artifact went unread. A clear verdict with this set is not a clean result.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  4. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "description": "A valid signature proves Lazaretto issued the verdict. It does NOT prove the artifact in front of you is the one attested: check claims.sub yourself.",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "claims": {
      +      "properties": {
      +        "iat": {
      +          "type": "integer"
      +        },
      +        "risk": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "rules_version": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "sub": {
      +          "description": "The subject the verdict is about: a sha256 or a package identity. Confirm this matches what you are about to run.",
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "verdict": {
      +          "enum": [
      +            "clear",
      +            "flagged",
      +            "malicious"
      +          ],
      +          "type": "string"
      +        }
      +      },
      +      "type": "object"
      +    },
      +    "contradicted": {
      +      "description": "True when a previously clear or flagged subject is now a known-bad match, so the attestation is stale.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "reason": {
      +      "description": "Why an invalid attestation failed, for example malformed_jws.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "valid": {
      +      "description": "Whether the signature verifies against Lazaretto's published keys.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "valid"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  5. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations (already readOnly/idempotent), it discloses cost and auth (free, anonymous), the return payload (signature validity plus signed claims), the conditional `contradicted` field and that its absence is not a safety or freshness verdict, and that a valid signature authenticates an earlier claim rather than current safety. That is unusually rich behavioral context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core value proposition (verify without re-scanning or paying) is front-loaded and every clause adds a distinct caveat. It is dense and slightly sentence-heavy, but no line is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers the gaps an agent could otherwise misread: cost, anonymity, what is and is not returned, the meaning of an omitted `contradicted`, and the `claims.sub` match requirement. With an output schema present, the remaining return detail is appropriately delegated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With a single parameter and 100% schema coverage the baseline is 3, but the description adds real semantics: the artifact's hash or package identity must match `claims.sub` for the claim to apply, which tells the agent what the input has to contain beyond 'a compact-JWS string'.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource (verify a Lazaretto scan attestation) and immediately scopes it against the obvious alternative by saying it works WITHOUT re-scanning or paying, which cleanly separates it from sibling scan_artifact/scan_lockfile_deep.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explains the triggering context ('an attestation that another agent, a README, or a lockfile handed you') and states exclusions ('Package identities are not rechecked here', SHA-256 subjects only). It stops short of naming the sibling to use instead of this one, so it is strong but not a full when/when-not/alternatives map.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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