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lazaretto

by io.github.jamesdfinance-dev

verify_attestation

Read-onlyIdempotent

Verify a Lazaretto scan attestation that another agent (or a README, or a lockfile) handed you, WITHOUT re-scanning or paying. Free and anonymous. Returns whether the signature is valid and Lazaretto's, the attested claims (verdict, risk, and the subject the verdict is about), and a contradicted flag if a previously-clear subject is now known-bad. You MUST still confirm the artifact you are about to run matches claims.sub (its sha256, or its package identity).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
attestationYesThe compact-JWS attestation string from a scan report.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
validYesWhether the signature verifies against Lazaretto's published keys.
claimsNo
reasonNoWhy an invalid attestation failed, for example malformed_jws.
contradictedNoTrue when a previously clear or flagged subject is now a known-bad match, so the attestation is stale.

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false. The description adds meaningful behavior beyond that: it discloses it is 'Free and anonymous', details the return fields (signature validity, claims, and the 'contradicted' flag semantics), and warns about a required verification step. This goes beyond what annotations alone provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but efficient, front-loading the core purpose and key constraint ('WITHOUT re-scanning or paying') before explaining returns and the required follow-up. Every sentence adds value; no fluff or redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given an output schema exists (which presumably details return values), the description covers all essential context: when to use it, what it returns, a critical usage caveat (confirming claims.sub), and the free/anonymous nature. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%; the schema describes the parameter as 'The compact-JWS attestation string from a scan report.' The description adds only the nuance that the attestation may come from 'another agent (or a README, or a lockfile)', which is minor. Baseline 3 is appropriate since the schema already documents the parameter.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Verify') and resource ('Lazaretto scan attestation'), and immediately clarifies scope: 'WITHOUT re-scanning or paying' distinguishes it from scan_artifact. It also explains exactly what it returns, making the purpose unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Context is explicit: it's for attestations 'another agent (or a README, or a lockfile) handed you', and it explicitly says 'WITHOUT re-scanning' implying you'd use a scanning tool otherwise. It also gives a mandatory follow-up action ('You MUST still confirm...'). It doesn't name sibling alternatives by name, but the guidance is clear enough.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Each tool has a distinct target and action: lockfile advisory checks, deep behavioral scans, MCP server scans, local tool-definition checks, hash lookups, and attestation operations. The closest overlap is check_lockfile vs scan_lockfile_deep and check_mcp_tools vs scan_mcp_server, but the descriptions clearly separate free vs paid and local vs remote workflows.

Naming Consistency4/5

Most tools follow a clear verb_noun snake_case pattern: check_lockfile, scan_artifact, scan_mcp_server, find_attestation, verify_attestation. known_bad_lookup is the one outlier, using an object-first pattern instead of a verb-first one, but it is still readable and does not create real confusion.

Tool Count5/5

Eight tools is well-scoped for a security-scanning service covering lockfiles, artifacts, MCP servers, hash lookups, and attestations. Each tool addresses a distinct use case, and the count is neither bloated nor thin for the server's purpose.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the main security workflows: advisory lockfile checks, deep behavioral scanning, MCP server vetting, local tool-definition analysis, known-bad hash lookups, and attestation discovery/verification. Minor gaps exist around explicitly creating or managing attestations, but scans likely generate them implicitly and the core lifecycle is coherent.

Resources