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Find an existing attestation (free)

find_attestation
Read-onlyIdempotent

Ask whether anyone has already attested an artifact, BEFORE you install it or pay to scan it. Free and anonymous. Give a package identity like "chalk@5.6.1", an MCP server endpoint URL, or a sha256 content hash. Returns the signed verdict if one exists, which you can verify offline against https://lazaretto.dev/.well-known/jwks.json, plus freshness: whether the corpus has since contradicted it and whether it was attested under an older rules version. A miss is not a verdict, it only means nobody has scanned this yet. When nobody has attested an npm package identity, the answer falls back to an identity check against published advisories: answer: "identity_check" with an identity_check object, and found still false, because an identity check is unsigned, looks at the identity rather than the code, and absence from the corpus is not a verdict. identity_check.listed_as_malware: true comes back as an error result, so a published malware version cannot be read as "nothing found"; null there means the corpus could not be consulted, which is unchecked and never clear.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "subject": "<subject>"
    },
    "name": "find_attestation"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
subjectYesA package identity ("chalk@5.6.1"), an MCP server endpoint URL, or a sha256 content hash, optionally sha256: prefixed.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
riskNo
foundYesFalse means nobody has attested it, which is not a clean verdict.
answerNo"identity_check" when nobody has attested the subject and an advisory lookup answered instead.
verdictNo
age_daysNo
attestationNoCompact JWS you can verify offline; it carries the verdict, never the evidence.
attested_atNo
stale_rulesNoTrue when attested under an older rules version.
contradictedNoNon-null when this subject is NOW a known-bad match.
identity_checkNoThe fallback answer, never an attestation. `listed_as_malware` is true (published as malware, returned as an error), false (not in the corpus, which is not a verdict on the code), or null (the corpus could not be consulted: unchecked, never clear).
analysis_partialNoPresent and true when the attested verdict covered only part of the artifact. A clear verdict with this set is not a clean result.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / properties / answer / description
      Previous value: -"\"identity_check\" when nobody has attested the subject and a free advisory lookup answered instead."New value: +"\"identity_check\" when nobody has attested the subject and an advisory lookup answered instead."
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / analysis_partial
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Present and true when the attested verdict covered only part of the artifact. A clear verdict with this set is not a clean result.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  3. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / answer
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "\"identity_check\" when nobody has attested the subject and a free advisory lookup answered instead.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / identity_check
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "The fallback answer, never an attestation. `listed_as_malware` is true (published as malware, returned as an error), false (not in the corpus, which is not a verdict on the code), or null (the corpus could not be consulted: unchecked, never clear).",
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  4. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / subject / description
      Previous value: -"A package identity (\"chalk@5.6.1\") or a sha256 content hash, optionally sha256: prefixed."New value: +"A package identity (\"chalk@5.6.1\"), an MCP server endpoint URL, or a sha256 content hash, optionally sha256: prefixed."
  5. Added

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well past the annotations (readOnly/idempotent/openWorld already cover safety) by disclosing return shape, offline verification against the JWKS URL, freshness fields, and the identity_check fallback semantics — including that listed_as_malware=true surfaces as an error and null means unchecked, not clear. That is exactly the kind of ambiguity-resolving behavior an agent cannot get from structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded: the when-to-use instruction is the first clause, and no sentence is filler — the freshness and identity_check details each prevent a specific misreading. The final paragraph is dense and runs long, but the density is load-bearing rather than padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Single required parameter, full schema coverage, and an output schema present — yet the description still covers the one thing the schema can't express: how to read a miss, a fallback, and a null. Nothing needed to call or interpret this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema's own subject description already lists the three accepted identity forms, so the description's parallel sentence adds little new syntax. Baseline 3 is appropriate; it does not, for example, clarify normalization or how whitespace/casing is handled.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb+resource ("Ask whether anyone has already attested an artifact") and immediately frames it as the free, no-scan lookup path, which separates it from scan_artifact/verify_attestation in the sibling list. The accepted subject forms (package identity, MCP endpoint URL, sha256 hash) further pin down the resource.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit sequencing guidance: run this BEFORE installing or paying to scan, and the caveat that a miss is not a verdict tells the agent how to interpret a negative. It never names verify_attestation or scan_artifact directly, so the routing is implied via "pay to scan" rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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