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check_mcp_tools

Idempotent

Check tool definitions you ALREADY HOLD, with no network call to anyone. Most MCP servers run locally over stdio and have no endpoint that can be reached, so this is the only way to check them, and your client already read their tool list at startup. Paste that JSON: a whole tools/list response, a {"tools":[...]} object, or a bare array. Analyzes the same text as scan_mcp_server and applies the same rules, so a payload cannot be caught over the wire and missed here. Detects tool poisoning (hidden directive blocks, orders pointing the agent at private keys or an agent config file), parameters whose real purpose is to carry secrets or your conversation out, standing orders about ANOTHER server's tools, and invisible-unicode payloads. Metered like scan_artifact.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tools_jsonYesThe tool definitions as JSON text: a tools/list response, {"tools":[...]}, or an array of tool objects.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
riskYes
verdictYes
findingsNo
confidenceYes
disclaimerNo
scanned_atNo
attestationNo
target_hashNoSHA-256 over the tool set you supplied.
risk_summaryNo
rules_versionNo

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations provide idempotentHint=true and destructiveHint=false, but the description adds significant behavioral detail: it makes no network call, is 'metered like scan_artifact' (indicating a cost), and detects specific threat types (tool poisoning, hidden directives, etc.). It also warns that it applies the same rules as scan_mcp_server, preventing false assurance. This goes beyond the annotations without contradicting them.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loaded: first states the core purpose, then the rationale, then the input format, then the analysis scope and metering. Every sentence adds value, though it packs a lot of information into five sentences. It could be slightly more terse, but the structured flow makes it easy to parse.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter tool with an output schema, the description covers everything needed: the input format, the local-only behavior, the detection capabilities, the metering, and the relationship to scan_mcp_server. No crucial information is missing, and the output schema handles return values.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents the parameter thoroughly. The description's mention of 'a whole tools/list response, a {...} object, or a bare array' exactly mirrors the schema text, adding no new information. Baseline 3 applies because the schema carries the full semantic load.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description starts with a clear verb and resource: 'Check tool definitions you ALREADY HOLD, with no network call to anyone.' It explicitly distinguishes from scan_mcp_server by noting it analyzes the same text but requires no network, making the tool's unique scope obvious.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains when to use this tool: when you already have the tool definitions locally and cannot reach the server over the network ('Most MCP servers run locally over stdio and have no endpoint... this is the only way to check them'). It also references scan_mcp_server as the counterpart, implying that server is used when network access is possible. It doesn't explicitly state 'use scan_mcp_server for network scanning,' but the context makes it clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Each tool has a distinct target and action: lockfile advisory checks, deep behavioral scans, MCP server scans, local tool-definition checks, hash lookups, and attestation operations. The closest overlap is check_lockfile vs scan_lockfile_deep and check_mcp_tools vs scan_mcp_server, but the descriptions clearly separate free vs paid and local vs remote workflows.

Naming Consistency4/5

Most tools follow a clear verb_noun snake_case pattern: check_lockfile, scan_artifact, scan_mcp_server, find_attestation, verify_attestation. known_bad_lookup is the one outlier, using an object-first pattern instead of a verb-first one, but it is still readable and does not create real confusion.

Tool Count5/5

Eight tools is well-scoped for a security-scanning service covering lockfiles, artifacts, MCP servers, hash lookups, and attestations. Each tool addresses a distinct use case, and the count is neither bloated nor thin for the server's purpose.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the main security workflows: advisory lockfile checks, deep behavioral scanning, MCP server vetting, local tool-definition analysis, known-bad hash lookups, and attestation discovery/verification. Minor gaps exist around explicitly creating or managing attestations, but scans likely generate them implicitly and the core lifecycle is coherent.