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Check tool definitions you already have (metered, no network)

check_mcp_tools
Idempotent

Check tool definitions you ALREADY HOLD, with no network call to anyone. Most MCP servers run locally over stdio and have no endpoint that can be reached, so this is the only way to check them, and your client already read their tool list at startup. Paste that JSON: a whole tools/list response, a {"tools":[...]} object, or a bare array. Analyzes the same text as scan_mcp_server and applies the same rules, so a payload cannot be caught over the wire and missed here. Detects tool poisoning (hidden directive blocks, orders pointing the agent at private keys or an agent config file), parameters whose real purpose is to carry secrets or your conversation out, standing orders about ANOTHER server's tools, and invisible-unicode payloads. Metered like scan_artifact.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "tools_json": "<tools_json>"
    },
    "name": "check_mcp_tools"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tools_jsonYesThe tool definitions as JSON text: a tools/list response, {"tools":[...]}, or an array of tool objects.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
riskYes`unknown` appears only with verdict `error`: the scan did not finish, so no level is asserted. It is not a clear result.
verdictYes
findingsNo
confidenceYes
disclaimerNo
scanned_atNo
attestationNo
target_hashNoSHA-256 over the tool set you supplied.
risk_summaryNo
rules_versionNo
tool_fingerprintNoHashes of what the server tells an agent: one per tool and one over all of them. Keep `sha256` when you approve a server and compare it on a later scan; a different value means its tools changed since, and the keys of `tools` whose hash differs say which. `partial` means a cap cut the read.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / risk / description
      Added value: +"`unknown` appears only with verdict `error`: the scan did not finish, so no level is asserted. It is not a clear result."
    • changedOutput schema / properties / risk / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "critical",
      -  "high",
      -  "medium",
      -  "low",
      -  "none"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "critical",
      +  "high",
      +  "medium",
      +  "low",
      +  "none",
      +  "unknown"
      +]
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / tool_fingerprint
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Hashes of what the server tells an agent: one per tool and one over all of them. Keep `sha256` when you approve a server and compare it on a later scan; a different value means its tools changed since, and the keys of `tools` whose hash differs say which. `partial` means a cap cut the read.",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "instructions": {
      +      "description": "SHA-256 of the server instructions, when it sets any.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "partial": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "sha256": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "tools": {
      +      "additionalProperties": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "description": "Tool name to SHA-256. A name that is not a plain identifier is replaced by tool-<hash>.",
      +      "type": "object"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  3. Added

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (destructiveHint=false, openWorldHint=false, idempotentHint=true), and the description reinforces the no-network claim and adds cost behavior plus the detection scope (poisoning, secret-exfil parameters, cross-server standing orders, invisible unicode). It does not explain why readOnlyHint is false or what happens with malformed JSON, so a small behavioral gap remains.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with the key distinction (already-held definitions, no network) before the mechanics and the detection list. The sentences are long and clause-heavy, and the detection enumeration is dense, but nearly every clause carries decision-relevant information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the description covers input shapes, when to use it, cost, and what categories of findings it produces. It stops short of stating failure behavior for invalid JSON or how findings map to a verdict, which for a security-scanning tool would be helpful.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and there is a single required parameter, so the schema already documents tools_json fully. The description restates the accepted payload shapes (tools/list response, {"tools":[...]}, bare array) without adding format or size constraints beyond that, so it sits at the baseline for a well-documented single parameter.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

"Check tool definitions you ALREADY HOLD, with no network call to anyone" states a specific verb (check), a specific resource (tool definitions you already have), and the scope boundary versus the network-based sibling. The reader can distinguish it from scan_mcp_server without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives the trigger condition ("Most MCP servers run locally over stdio and have no endpoint that can be reached, so this is the only way to check them"), names the alternative (scan_mcp_server) and explains the parity relationship, and notes the client already fetched the tool list at startup. It also flags cost ("Metered like scan_artifact"), which affects whether an agent chooses this route.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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