Convenience-verify a PriorSeal receipt with the deployment key registry. Independent local verification remains required for trust decisions.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | Yes | Receipt object to verify. |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | Yes | ||
| risk | Yes | ||
| tool | Yes | ||
| schema | Yes | ||
| status | Yes | ||
| nextAction | Yes | ||
| requiresHumanSignature | Yes | ||
| mayBroadcastTransaction | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+ "additionalProperties": false,
+ "properties": {
+ "data": {},
+ "mayBroadcastTransaction": {
+ "const": false
+ },
+ "nextAction": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "requiresHumanSignature": {
+ "type": "boolean"
+ },
+ "risk": {
+ "additionalProperties": false,
+ "properties": {
+ "level": {
+ "enum": [
+ "read_only",
+ "human_signature_required",
+ "service_state_change",
+ "verification_only",
+ "input_or_service_error"
+ ]
+ },
+ "reasonCode": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "level",
+ "reasonCode"
+ ],
+ "type": "object"
+ },
+ "schema": {
+ "const": "priorseal.mcp.tool-result.v1"
+ },
+ "status": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "tool": {
+ "const": "priorseal_verify_receipt"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "schema",
+ "tool",
+ "status",
+ "nextAction",
+ "requiresHumanSignature",
+ "mayBroadcastTransaction",
+ "risk",
+ "data"
+ ],
+ "type": "object"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive/closed-world, so the description correctly focuses on adding the trust caveat that convenience verification is not authoritative for trust decisions. That is genuinely useful context beyond the annotation set, though it says nothing about rate limits or failure modes.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, the core action front-loaded and the caveat second. Every clause earns its place with no redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the trust caveat covers the main judgment an agent needs. Missing only guidance on where a receipt to verify comes from relative to get_receipt.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% for the single receipt parameter, so the schema already carries the semantics. The description adds no parameter-level detail (no expected receipt shape or source), making 3 the appropriate baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ("verify a PriorSeal receipt") and names the mechanism (deployment key registry), which cleanly separates it from the retrieval sibling get_receipt. It does not explicitly name that sibling, so differentiation is implied rather than stated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
"Independent local verification remains required for trust decisions" gives a clear when-not-to-rely-on-this boundary, effectively routing authoritative trust checks elsewhere. It stops short of naming a concrete alternative tool or the exact precondition for calling it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.