Generate a secret and place it at a vendor
secret_generateGenerate a random secret and place it directly at a vendor resource SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| to | Yes | ||
| bytes | No |
secret_generateGenerate a random secret and place it directly at a vendor resource SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| to | Yes | ||
| bytes | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds a genuinely non-obvious trait: generation and placement happen SERVER-SIDE and the secret value is never returned to the caller, which changes how an agent should reason about the result. It still omits what happens if a value already exists at the target key, which matters given destructiveHint=true.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence that carries the action, the destination, and the constraining behavior with zero padding. Nothing in it is redundant with the title or restates the name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a destructive, non-idempotent, open-world write with a nested parameter object at 0% schema coverage and no output schema, the description leaves the agent without the parameter contract or conflict/overwrite semantics. It covers the privacy behavior well but not enough of the calling contract.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the schema contains a nested 'to' object with vendor/resource/key plus a constrained 'bytes' field (16-64). The description only echoes 'vendor resource' in passing and says nothing about the key identifier, the required nesting, or the byte-size bounds, so it fails to compensate for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (generate) plus the resource (random secret) and its destination (vendor resource, server-side), so the agent knows exactly what the call produces. It does not differentiate itself from the sibling secret_transfer, which is the nearest alternative an agent could confuse it with.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'the value never enters this conversation' implicitly frames when to choose this tool (secrets the agent must not see), which is useful context. However, it never says when NOT to use it or names secret_transfer as the alternative for moving a secret the agent already holds.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.