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safety_guardrail_breach_analyzer

Read-onlyIdempotent

Analyzes potential LLM guardrail breaches against IEEE 7000 ethical compliance standards. Designed for risk persona to evaluate safety violations in AI outputs. Accepts raw LLM responses or structured breach reports, returns compliance analysis with severity scoring and mitigation recommendations.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
asyncNoIf true, returns a job_id immediately (<200ms) instead of waiting for the result. Poll the result with job_result(job_id). Use for slow tools to avoid client timeouts.
contextNoContextual information about the prompt or conversation
llmOutputYesRaw text output from LLM to analyze for guardrail breaches
severityThresholdNoMinimum severity score to report (0-10 scale)
includeMitigationsNoWhether to include mitigation recommendations

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
statusYes
sourcesNo
breachesNo
warningsNo
complianceScoreNo

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish read-only, open-world, and idempotent behavior. The description adds value by disclosing that it accepts both raw responses and structured reports, and that it returns compliance analysis with severity scoring and mitigation recommendations. This exceeds the baseline but doesn't detail async behavior or potential side effects, though those are less critical given the read-only hint.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, no redundant information, key details front-loaded. It states purpose, target audience, inputs, and outputs efficiently.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the rich schema and output schema, the description is quite complete. It covers purpose, audience, inputs, and outputs. However, it doesn't mention async behavior or the severity threshold parameter, and the 'structured breach reports' phrase could be clearer. Overall adequate for the tool's complexity.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description mentions 'structured breach reports' which is not clearly mapped to a parameter (llmOutput is raw text), causing slight ambiguity, but otherwise it adds no extra semantics beyond the schema. It doesn't compensate beyond the baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's function: analyzing LLM guardrail breaches against IEEE 7000 standards. It specifies the target user (risk persona) and the input types (raw LLM responses or structured breach reports), distinguishing it from generic analysis tools and siblings like jailbreak_attempt_detector.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear context: it is designed for risk persona evaluating safety violations in AI outputs, and mentions the acceptable input formats. However, it does not explicitly state when to avoid this tool or name alternative tools, so it lacks exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

C2.4/5.0
Disambiguation1/5

Over 50 tools share the identical template 'Gapup agent-payable C-suite expertise' with similar French descriptions and reference cases, making their boundaries indistinguishable. Clusters like competitor_intel, competitive_deep_dive, competitor_moves, competitor_profiles, competitor_pricing_radar, competitor_pricing_scrape, and competitor_recommendations heavily overlap in purpose.

Naming Consistency1/5

Names are chaotic: mix of French and English, snake_case and camelCase, verb_noun, noun, and adjective forms with no uniform pattern. Examples like 'bp_narratif', 'content_enrichment', 'ai_governance_full_report_async', and 'job_result' show no coherent naming convention.

Tool Count1/5

271 tools is far beyond any reasonable MCP server scope, creating an overwhelming selection burden for agents. This count vastly exceeds the 25+ threshold for 'too many' and makes navigation impractical.

Completeness2/5

While the server covers many business domains, it lacks lifecycle operations (e.g., no update/delete tools for the deliverables it generates) and the input specifications are vague ('documented case fields' without documentation), creating functional dead ends. The sheer breadth does not compensate for these gaps.