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gblin-treasury-risk-regime

receipts.seal

Append the HASHES of an AI action to GBLIN's public RFC 6962 transparency log and return a portable receipt: Ed25519 signature, inclusion proof, operator-signed C2SP checkpoint, plus the latest on-chain anchor (EAS on Base, daily). mode=demo (the only mode over MCP): 5 seals/day/IP, receipts marked demo:true. Unlimited seals are a paid x402 HTTP endpoint (resource gblin://howto/seal). Provenance is self-reported: the receipt proves existence and time of the record, not that the action happened. The action/agent_id/tool/meta strings are PUBLISHED in the log: identifiers only, never secrets. Fields not listed here are ignored and NOT recorded.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
metaNoExtra JSON object as a string (optional). PUBLISHED.
modeNoOnly 'demo' is available over MCP (5/day/IP). Paid seals go through x402 HTTP.demo
toolNoTool/model used (optional). PUBLISHED.
actionYesWhat the AI did, short label. PUBLISHED in the log.
agent_idNoYour agent identifier (optional). PUBLISHED.
input_hashYessha256 of the input/prompt, 64 hex chars (0x prefix optional)
output_hashNosha256 of the output, 64 hex chars (optional; empty or blank = omitted)

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
leafYesbase64 SHA256(0x00 || canonical)
rootYesbase64 Merkle root at tree_size
indexYes
anchorYesLatest daily EAS anchor of the tree root on Base and whether it already covers this receipt
formatYes
payloadYesThe signed, canonicalized record (gblin-canonical-json/1)
signatureYesbase64 Ed25519 over 'gblin-receipt/v1\n' + canonical
tree_sizeYes
checkpointYesC2SP signed note (origin, size, root)
provenanceYesWhat the receipt does and does not prove
verifier_keyYesC2SP note verifier key: origin+hash+base64(0x01||pub)
inclusion_proofYes

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false), the description discloses that action/agent_id/tool/meta strings are published in the log, that only identifiers not secrets should be sent, that provenance is self-reported, and that unrecognized fields are ignored. It also reveals the daily on-chain anchor cadence. This gives the agent a rich safety and trust model.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Every sentence earns its place: core action first, then demo constraints, then the alternative paid endpoint, then the trust caveat, then the privacy warning, then the field-ignoring rule. The density is high but there is zero fluff, and the most decision-relevant information is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a sealing tool with 7 parameters, output schema, and security/privacy implications, the description covers the key operational constraints, return contents, rate limits, mode availability, and data-publication behavior. The existence of an output schema means detailed return fields need not be repeated, and nothing necessary for correct invocation is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful semantic value by marking action/agent_id/tool/meta as PUBLISHED and warning that unlisted fields are ignored and NOT recorded. This is privacy-relevant context beyond the schema's per-parameter descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence states a precise verb and resource: append hashes of an AI action to GBLIN's RFC 6962 transparency log and return a portable receipt. It names the concrete output artifacts (Ed25519 signature, inclusion proof, C2SP checkpoint, on-chain anchor), fully distinguishing it from siblings like receipts.get and receipts.verify.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description clearly scopes the MCP mode ('mode=demo', 5 seals/day/IP) and points to the paid x402 HTTP endpoint for unlimited seals. It also warns about the self-reported provenance limitation. It does not explicitly contrast with receipts.get/receipts.verify, but the sealing vs. retrieving/verifying distinction is implied by the names and first sentence.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Disambiguation5/5

Each tool has a distinct purpose: coherence.report for metrics, protocol.info/stats for protocol data, receipts.get/seal/verify for receipt lifecycle, risk.regime for live risk, and risk.attestation_sample for testing. No two tools overlap in functionality.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dot-separated prefix pattern is consistent, but the second part mixes verbs (report, get, seal, verify) with nouns (info, stats, attestation_sample, regime). This inconsistency could confuse agents expecting a uniform verb-object structure.

Tool Count5/5

With 8 tools, the server covers its stated domain (risk regime, protocol info, receipts) without bloat. Each tool serves a clear, non-redundant role, fitting the typical 3-15 tool range.

Completeness5/5

The toolkit covers all core operations: querying risk, retrieving protocol info/stats, managing receipts (create, retrieve, verify), and providing a test sample. No essential functionality appears missing for the described free-tier scope.