Bounty Engineer Agent Commerce

Paid MCP Manifest Security Audit — static tool safety report

paid_mcp_manifest_security

Audit up to 200 uploaded MCP tool definitions for potential prompt injection, conflicting annotations and schema issues. $1.90 buyer-authorized x402 USDC; no tool execution, no security guarantee. Example: {input:{manifest:{tools:[{name:'search',description:'Search docs',inputSchema:{type:'object'}}]}}}.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "paid_mcp_manifest_security"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`input`	No	Required manifest.tools array (1 to 200 uploaded tool definitions). Do not provide secrets or private keys.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

AddedOct 31, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description adds important behavioral context beyond annotations: the $1.90 buyer-authorized x402 USDC payment, the 200-definition limit, no tool execution, and no security guarantee. It does not explain failure/refund behavior or the exact report structure, but it covers the key constraints for a paid static audit.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core task, followed by cost and limitations, then a compact input example. Every sentence carries relevant information without waste.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given one broad parameter, no output schema, and annotations covering side-effect hints, the description gives enough context to invoke the tool: what is audited, the scope, cost, authorization model, and limitations. It could be stronger by describing the returned report format, but the core invocation context is present.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the parameter is already documented, but the description adds a concrete nested input example showing the manifest.tools shape. That is useful given the single broad 'input' object and nested structure, though it does not enumerate every nested field.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: audit uploaded MCP tool definitions for prompt injection, conflicting annotations, and schema issues, with a clear 1–200 tool scope. It is distinguishable from the commerce-oriented siblings, though it does not explicitly contrast with the closest schema-related sibling.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by 'Audit up to 200 uploaded MCP tool definitions' and the explicit note that no tools are executed, but there is no direct routing guidance for when to choose this over alternatives such as paid_json_contract_check or other paid audit tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Bounty Engineer Agent Commerce tools Inspect

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