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Moretes Architect MCP

mcp_server_review

Read-onlyIdempotent

Heuristic safety review of ANOTHER MCP server from its tools/list output: tool-poisoning text, missing annotations, risky parameters, free-form schemas, name shadowing and context cost. Paste the JSON your client shows.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toolsYes
serverNameYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kindNo
toolsNo
serverNo
sourcesNo
summaryNo
verdictNo
findingsNo
validatedNo
limitationNo
limitationsNo
approxContextTokensNo
recommendedAllowlistNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint=false, so safety is covered structurally. The description still adds value by labeling the analysis 'heuristic' (i.e., non-authoritative findings) and by disclosing the exact threat surface it inspects, which goes beyond what the annotations convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two dense sentences: the scope and input source come first, then the checklist of inspected artifacts. No filler, and the enumerated checks are compact enough to scan without padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the annotations cover the safety profile. What remains thin is the mapping between the two required parameters and the pasted payload, plus any note on the 300-tool cap, but the description is sufficient to invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry the load. 'Paste the JSON your client shows' meaningfully clarifies that the tools array should be raw tools/list output, but the required serverName parameter is only obliquely implied by 'ANOTHER MCP server' and is never defined.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('safety review of ANOTHER MCP server from its tools/list output') and enumerates the six checks performed, so an agent knows exactly what it produces. The phrase 'ANOTHER MCP server' and 'from its tools/list output' distinguish it from the sibling mcp_config_review, which operates on config rather than a live tools/list dump.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'Paste the JSON your client shows' gives a concrete input instruction, and 'ANOTHER MCP server' implies it is not for self-review. However, it never names when to prefer it over mcp_config_review, prompt_injection_checklist, or other review siblings, leaving the routing decision to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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