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Scan GitHub Repository Before Install

scan

Static supply-chain security scan of a public GitHub repo before an agent installs/runs it. Flags exfil sinks, obfuscation, credential reads, install-time curl|bash. risk=clean|suspicious|dangerous. Payment challenge and credentials are bound to GET https://agents.samedaydesk.com/scan, not mcp://. Retry the identical authorized arguments and credential.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
repoYesPublic GitHub repo: owner/name or URL

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okYes
repoYes
riskYes
branchYes
summaryYes
findingsYes
scannedAtYes
disclaimerYes
filesScannedYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": false,
      +  "properties": {
      +    "branch": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "disclaimer": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "filesScanned": {
      +      "minimum": 0,
      +      "type": "integer"
      +    },
      +    "findings": {
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": false,
      +        "properties": {
      +          "file": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "severity": {
      +            "enum": [
      +              "danger",
      +              "warn"
      +            ],
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "why": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "required": [
      +          "file",
      +          "severity",
      +          "why"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "maxItems": 50,
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "ok": {
      +      "const": true,
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "repo": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "risk": {
      +      "enum": [
      +        "clean",
      +        "suspicious",
      +        "dangerous"
      +      ],
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "scannedAt": {
      +      "format": "date-time",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "summary": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "ok",
      +    "repo",
      +    "branch",
      +    "filesScanned",
      +    "risk",
      +    "summary",
      +    "findings",
      +    "disclaimer",
      +    "scannedAt"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and largely meets it: it discloses the analysis type, the specific threat classes flagged (exfil sinks, obfuscation, credential reads, install-time curl|bash), and the risk taxonomy. It also surfaces an unusual operational quirk — that the payment challenge and credential are bound to a GET URL rather than mcp://, with retry guidance. Missing auth/permission prerequisites and rate-limit or read-only confirmation, so not a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose, then flagged threats, then risk values, then the payment/retry note. Sentences are dense and every one carries information, though the payment-binding sentence is terse enough to require a second read.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return format need not be spelled out, and the description still names the risk values. Given zero annotations, the description covers the important behavioral ground (what it checks, the payment flow, retry semantics); it stops short of permissions or timing expectations but is broadly sufficient for a one-parameter scan tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single 'repo' parameter is fully documented in the schema ('Public GitHub repo: owner/name or URL'). The description adds no syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'Static supply-chain security scan of a public GitHub repo before an agent installs/runs it.' No sibling tool overlaps this function, so the agent can identify it immediately. The risk-level vocabulary (clean|suspicious|dangerous) further pins down what it produces.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The trigger is explicit and contextual: run this 'before an agent installs/runs it,' which tells the agent exactly when the tool applies. It does not name alternatives or when-not-to-use, but no sibling provides comparable repo-scanning capability, so this is close to complete.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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