Rotate Endpoint Secret
rotate_endpoint_secretAuthenticated tool for rotating the signing secret for one endpoint.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| appId | Yes | ||
| endpointId | Yes |
rotate_endpoint_secretAuthenticated tool for rotating the signing secret for one endpoint.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| appId | Yes | ||
| endpointId | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, so the safety profile is known. The description adds only 'Authenticated', but omits the operationally critical behaviors: that the previous secret is immediately invalidated, whether the new secret is returned only once, and that downstream consumers must be updated. For a destructive mutation this is a meaningful gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with no filler, which is efficient. It leans toward under-specification rather than padding, but there is no wasted text.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a destructive, non-idempotent credential rotation with no output schema and zero parameter documentation, the description omits what the agent most needs: the effect on the old secret, the irreversibility, and how to obtain the new secret. It is insufficient for the tool's risk level.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description never mentions appId or endpointId, so it compensates for nothing. Neither the identifier format nor which endpoint scope the appId must match is documented anywhere.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('rotating') and resource ('the signing secret for one endpoint'), which implicitly distinguishes it from the sibling rotate_source_token. It is clear but does not explicitly call out that distinction or the scope of what is affected.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance on when to rotate versus revoke_api_key, archive_source, or delete_endpoint, and no prerequisites for making rotation safe. The agent must infer the appropriate moment from the name alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.