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Quartermaster eSIM

by io.github.dvirmimon123-tech
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Revoke an agent

revoke_agent
DestructiveIdempotent

Disable one agent of your principal permanently. Use it when an agent is unknown, compromised or no longer needed; it frees its slot. After this it can no longer authenticate (AGENT_REVOKED) and no longer holds a slot under max_agents_per_principal. Needs your agent credentials and the principal_key (argument or X-Principal-Key header). Its orders stay visible to the principal's other agents. Repeating it changes nothing (already_revoked).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "target_agent_id": "<target_agent_id>"
    },
    "name": "revoke_agent"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
agent_idNoYour agent id (or X-Agent-Id header)
agent_keyNoSecret returned by register_agent (or X-Agent-Key header)
principal_idNoThe principal you act for (or X-Principal-Id header)
principal_keyNoThe principal's current principal_key (or X-Principal-Key header)
target_agent_idYesagent_id of the agent to revoke; list_agents shows them

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / target_agent_id / description
      Previous value: -"The agent to revoke"New value: +"agent_id of the agent to revoke; list_agents shows them"
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the destructiveHint/idempotentHint annotations: it discloses the permanent effect, the resulting AGENT_REVOKED authentication failure, slot release under max_agents_per_principal, that orders remain visible to other agents, and that repeats are no-ops (already_revoked). It also states the credential requirements.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core action and permanence, then layers usage triggers, side effects, auth needs, and idempotency in a tight sequence. No sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, credential-gated mutation with no output schema, the description covers outcome, error signal, slot accounting, and idempotency — everything an agent needs to call it safely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all five parameters including header alternatives. The description restates the credential and principal_key requirement without adding format or validation detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Disable one agent of your principal permanently') with the scope qualifier 'one' and 'permanently'. It is clearly distinguishable from siblings like register_agent, list_agents, and rotate_principal_key.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit when-to-use triggers: 'when an agent is unknown, compromised or no longer needed'. It does not name an alternative tool or state when not to use it, but the sibling set makes the boundary fairly obvious.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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