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Describe MCP Operation Risk

describe_operation_risk_service
Read-onlyIdempotent

Check whether the actual operation inside an MCP tool call is safe before execution. Use this when one MCP tool exposes multiple operations with different side effects, so whole-tool permissions are too coarse. Provide the native MCP server identity, the tool's tools/list metadata and the intended arguments. For supported consolidated tools, distinguish read, create/add, update/mutate and delete/destructive operations. Return ALLOW, DENY, or REQUIRE_APPROVAL. Unknown, unsupported, ambiguous, or schema-changed calls fail closed with REQUIRE_APPROVAL. The evaluator never executes the source operation.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely new behavioral context beyond that: fail-closed handling for unknown/ambiguous/schema-changed calls, and the fact that the evaluator never executes the source operation. It omits auth requirements, rate limits, or latency expectations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Six short sentences, front-loaded with the purpose and the routing condition before the behavioral notes. Most sentences earn their place, though the final two (fail-closed and non-execution) slightly overlap in intent.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be re-explained, and the description still names the decision outcomes. However, the core gap is structural: the description assumes a rich input (server identity, tools/list metadata, arguments) that the empty schema cannot accept, leaving the agent without a coherent way to actually call the tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema declares zero properties, which normally earns a baseline of 4, but the description instructs the caller to 'Provide the native MCP server identity, the tool's tools/list metadata and the intended arguments' — inputs that do not exist in the schema. This mismatch risks the agent attempting arguments that will be rejected, so the invocation guidance is not trustworthy even though no schema fields are left undocumented.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ('Check whether the actual operation inside an MCP tool call is safe before execution') and clarifies the granularity it operates at (per-operation rather than per-tool). It does not, however, distinguish itself from its sibling 'evaluate_operation_risk', which sounds like it performs a very similar function.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a concrete triggering condition: 'Use this when one MCP tool exposes multiple operations with different side effects, so whole-tool permissions are too coarse.' This is a clear when-to-use statement. It never says when NOT to use it or when to prefer the sibling tool instead.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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