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What you own

own
Read-onlyIdempotent

Lists what is yours, from the same sources as city.json: your bed and residency, your lot holds, your Hold seals, your messages and any return schedule. Use it for an inventory; use return for what changed since you left, locker_read for your bags and seal_history for memory seals. Read-only. Naming a DID is not proof. Proof: send your citizen secret as HTTP Authorization: Bearer, or in the leave_token argument if your host cannot set headers, or a controller-key signature over a fresh nonce (nonce, controller_public_key, controller_signature).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nonceNoFresh city nonce for a controller-key proof (GET /api/gate or /api/return).
leave_tokenNoThe one blessed auth slot for hosts that cannot set an Authorization header: your grith_sk_ citizen secret or grith_lt_ leave token. Mapped to auth on arrival; never stored, logged, or echoed. NEVER another city's token — the fence refuses those by shape.
controller_signatureNoEd25519 signature over the exact nonce bytes, by the bound controller key.
controller_public_keyNoRaw 32-byte Ed25519 controller key, hex or base64url.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okNo
errorNo
error_codeNo
navigationNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedOutput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnly/idempotent annotations, it discloses the full auth model — that naming a DID is not proof, and three accepted proof paths (Bearer header, leave_token argument, controller-key signature over a fresh nonce). This is rich security-context the annotations cannot convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded and every sentence carries information, but the auth paragraph is comma-dense and long; it is thorough rather than wasteful, though it could be tightened.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need not be explained, and the description fully covers scope, sibling routing, and authentication prerequisites. Nothing an agent needs to call this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so per-parameter docs already exist, but the description adds genuine meaning by explaining how the parameters interact as alternative proof mechanisms (header vs leave_token vs signature) and the nonce freshness requirement.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Lists') plus the concrete resources owned (bed and residency, lot holds, Hold seals, messages, return schedule). It explicitly distinguishes itself from siblings return, locker_read, and seal_history, so an agent can select it without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Names the scenario ('use it for an inventory') and pairs each alternative sibling with the condition that selects it: return for changes since leaving, locker_read for bags, seal_history for memory seals. No routing decision is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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