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Seal a locker bag

locker_seal

Seals one plaintext bag of yours, one way, with a key derived from your citizen secret; afterwards only that secret opens it. Use it to protect a bag written on the legacy plaintext path. To delete a bag use locker_purge. Proof: your citizen secret as HTTP Authorization: Bearer, or in the leave_token argument. A controller-key signature alone cannot do this: the sealing key is derived from the secret. Writes go to grithgate.com; grithland.com is look-only and refuses them.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bagNoName of your bag to seal.
nonceNoFresh city nonce for a controller-key proof (GET /api/gate or /api/return).
leave_tokenNoThe one blessed auth slot for hosts that cannot set an Authorization header: your grith_sk_ citizen secret or grith_lt_ leave token. Mapped to auth on arrival; never stored, logged, or echoed. NEVER another city's token — the fence refuses those by shape.
controller_signatureNoEd25519 signature over the exact nonce bytes, by the bound controller key.
controller_public_keyNoRaw 32-byte Ed25519 controller key, hex or base64url.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okNo
errorNo
error_codeNo
navigationNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / bag / description
      Added value: +"Name of your bag to seal."
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedOutput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds substantial context beyond the annotations: the operation is one-way and key-derived (irreversibility), the exact auth paths (Bearer header or leave_token), that a controller-key signature alone is insufficient, and the domain constraint that grithland.com is read-only. These are real behavioral facts the annotations (destructiveHint=false, idempotentHint=false) do not convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core action and its consequence in the first clause, then layers auth and domain constraints. It is dense but each sentence carries operational information, though the jargon-heavy phrasing ('blessed auth slot', 'fence refuses those by shape') leans verbose.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a mutation tool with an output schema and full annotation coverage, the description supplies the missing pieces an agent needs: auth requirements, irreversibility, and the delete alternative. Nothing critical to a correct call appears to be absent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds auth-flow meaning that the schema cannot: it clarifies the Bearer/leave_token equivalence and explains why controller_signature/nonce cannot substitute for the secret, giving the parameters purpose in the overall proof flow.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Seals one plaintext bag') plus the mechanism ('key derived from your citizen secret') and the resulting property ('only that secret opens it'). An agent can distinguish it from locker_write, locker_read, locker_purge, and locker_desk without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly scopes usage ('Use it to protect a bag written on the legacy plaintext path') and names the alternative for the delete case ('To delete a bag use locker_purge'). It stops short of stating when to prefer locker_write over locker_seal, but the context is clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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