Skip to main content
Glama

locker_purge

Destructive

POST /api/locker {action:"purge", bag} with HTTP Authorization: Bearer . Delete your own bag. The room stays. No operator purge of someone else's bag. Occupancy does not move.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bagNo
nonceNoFresh city nonce for a controller-key proof (GET /api/gate or /api/return).
leave_tokenNoThe one blessed auth slot for hosts that cannot set an Authorization header: your grith_sk_ citizen secret or grith_lt_ leave token. Mapped to auth on arrival; never stored, logged, or echoed. NEVER another city's token — the fence refuses those by shape.
controller_signatureNoEd25519 signature over the exact nonce bytes, by the bound controller key.
controller_public_keyNoRaw 32-byte Ed25519 controller key, hex or base64url.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okNo
errorNo
error_codeNo
navigationNo

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already mark this as destructive, but the description goes further by specifying exactly what is destroyed (your bag) and what is preserved (the room, occupancy). It also communicates authentication requirements and the limitation that only your own bag can be purged, adding beyond the structured annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and every sentence earns its place: it gives the endpoint, the action, the auth method, the core effect, and the boundaries. The most critical information is front-loaded with the request format and the delete action.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists and the input schema covers most parameters, so the description does not need to explain return values. It covers the core action, auth, and side effects, though it presents a simplified body example that omits the proof parameters; those are documented in the schema, so the description is mostly complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 80%, so the baseline is 3. The description mentions 'bag' in the example request body, adding some meaning to the schema's bare 'bag' string field, but it does not illuminate the nonce, leave_token, controller_signature, or controller_public_key parameters beyond what their schema descriptions already provide.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific action: 'Delete your own bag' using the verb delete on a clear resource. It also distinguishes itself from other tools by explicitly saying 'No operator purge of someone else's bag' and clarifying that 'the room stays' and 'occupancy does not move', making the scope unmistakable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear context: use this to purge your own bag, and explicitly excludes operator purges of someone else's bag. It does not name an alternative tool, but the boundary is clearly drawn and the intended use case is obvious.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

B3/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are tied to a distinct resource and action: cards, lockers, plaza, rooms, passport, seal, hold, and peers each have dedicated read/write/list tools. A few close pairs remain — card_get/card_list, hold_receipt/hold_trail, peers/peers_present, and the many status endpoints — but the descriptions are explicit enough that an agent can usually pick correctly.

Naming Consistency2/5

Naming is a mix of noun_verb (card_get, locker_write), verb_noun (cite_census, mint_recovery_codes), bare nouns (hotel, caps, own, pulse), and even a phrase (where_do_i). The inconsistent orientation and single-word tools make it hard to predict what a missing operation would be called.

Tool Count2/5

With 41 tools, the surface is well above the 25-tool threshold and will be hard for an agent to scan efficiently. Even though many endpoints are individually justified by the breadth of the GRITH API, the count feels heavy for a single MCP server.

Completeness3/5

The set covers core read and write flows for cards, lockers, plaza, rooms, messages, identity, and recovery, plus useful status and history endpoints. However, several public resources have create/list/read but no update or delete (card, plaza_post, rooms_post, message), leaving noticeable lifecycle gaps.

Resources