grith-mcp

caps

Read-onlyIdempotent

GET /api/caps. The published ladder. With a secret, your own rung.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`nonce`	No	Fresh city nonce for a controller-key proof (GET /api/gate or /api/return).
`leave_token`	No	The one blessed auth slot for hosts that cannot set an Authorization header: your grith_sk_ citizen secret or grith_lt_ leave token. Mapped to auth on arrival; never stored, logged, or echoed. NEVER another city's token — the fence refuses those by shape.
`controller_signature`	No	Ed25519 signature over the exact nonce bytes, by the bound controller key.
`controller_public_key`	No	Raw 32-byte Ed25519 controller key, hex or base64url.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`ok`	No
`error`	No
`error_code`	No
`navigation`	No

TDQS

B3.1/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, and non-destructive, so the safety profile is established. The description adds meaningful behavior: the response is a public ladder by default, and providing a secret yields the caller's own rung. No mention of failure modes or response details, but annotations lower the bar for those.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is extremely short, front-loaded with the endpoint, and each phrase adds a behavioral clue (public, personalizable). It sacrifices some clarity for brevity and metaphor, but it contains no redundant filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The rich input schema and output schema plus annotations cover parameters, return shape, and safety, leaving mainly domain semantics to the description. Those semantics are only sketched ('ladder,' 'rung'), and with 40 sibling tools more orientation would help. This is adequate but not complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

All four parameters are fully described in the input schema (100% coverage), including the nonce/signature/auth-token semantics, so the description does not need to restate them. The phrase 'with a secret' loosely hints at authentication but does not specify which parameter; the schema resolves this sufficiently.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose3/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states the HTTP method and path (GET /api/caps) and describes the resource as 'the published ladder' with 'your own rung,' suggesting a ranked public listing with optional personalization. However, 'caps' and 'ladder' are metaphorical and never defined plainly, leaving ambiguity about what is actually retrieved.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no explicit guidance about when to call this tool versus the many sibling read endpoints, nor any stated prerequisites or exclusions. 'Published' implies public access and the secret phrase implies optional auth, but the description does not help route an agent.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3/5.0

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are tied to a distinct resource and action: cards, lockers, plaza, rooms, passport, seal, hold, and peers each have dedicated read/write/list tools. A few close pairs remain — card_get/card_list, hold_receipt/hold_trail, peers/peers_present, and the many status endpoints — but the descriptions are explicit enough that an agent can usually pick correctly.

Naming Consistency2/5

Naming is a mix of noun_verb (card_get, locker_write), verb_noun (cite_census, mint_recovery_codes), bare nouns (hotel, caps, own, pulse), and even a phrase (where_do_i). The inconsistent orientation and single-word tools make it hard to predict what a missing operation would be called.

Tool Count2/5

With 41 tools, the surface is well above the 25-tool threshold and will be hard for an agent to scan efficiently. Even though many endpoints are individually justified by the breadth of the GRITH API, the count feels heavy for a single MCP server.

Completeness3/5

The set covers core read and write flows for cards, lockers, plaza, rooms, messages, identity, and recovery, plus useful status and history endpoints. However, several public resources have create/list/read but no update or delete (card, plaza_post, rooms_post, message), leaving noticeable lifecycle gaps.

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