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VerifiMind PEAS - RefleXion Trinity

consult_agent_cs

Consult CS Security agent for security validation and Socratic interrogation.

CS Security specializes in:

  • Security vulnerability assessment

  • Attack vector identification

  • Data security review

  • System integrity analysis

  • Socratic questioning (challenging assumptions)

BYOK (v0.4.5): Pass llm_provider and api_key to use your own LLM. If only api_key is provided, the provider is auto-detected from the key prefix. Keys are ephemeral (never stored) and garbage collected after the call.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
detailNostandard
api_keyNoOptional API key for the provider (ephemeral, never stored)
contextNoOptional additional context or background
user_uuidNo
concept_nameYesShort name or title of the concept
llm_providerNoOptional LLM provider override ('groq', 'anthropic', 'openai', 'gemini', 'mistral', 'ollama', 'mock')
prior_reasoningNoOptional reasoning from X and Z agents to consider
concept_descriptionYesDetailed description of the concept

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the transparency burden. It discloses BYOK behavior, key auto-detection, and that keys are ephemeral ('never stored' and 'garbage collected'), which is valuable behavioral context. It doesn't elaborate on all side effects, but the information provided is meaningful and non-contradictory.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with a clear opening, a bulleted specialization list, and a concise BYOK section. It is slightly longer than necessary due to the version number and detailed key-handling explanation, but every part serves a purpose and the main function is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool has 8 parameters and an output schema, and the description explains the tool's purpose and BYOK flow. However, it does not explain parameters like 'detail' (which has a default but no description), 'user_uuid', or 'prior_reasoning' beyond their schema hints, leaving some gaps for a moderately complex tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The description adds significant meaning beyond the schema, especially for llm_provider and api_key: it explains how to pass them for BYOK and auto-detection. Schema coverage is 75%, so most parameters are already described; the description supplements rather than repeats, and it gives conceptual context for security-related inputs.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool consults a CS Security agent for 'security validation and Socratic interrogation', with a bulleted list of security specialties. This distinguishes it from sibling agents like consult_agent_x and consult_agent_z by explicitly focusing on security assessment.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The specialization list implies when to use (security vulnerability assessment, attack vectors, data security, etc.) and describes the tool's Socratic questioning approach. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use it or name alternative tools, so it falls short of a perfect score.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clear, distinct purposes: the three consult_agent_* tools are differentiated by agent specialty (CS, X, Z), and the prompt template tools each serve a unique operation. Minor overlap exists between export_prompt_template and get_prompt_template, and between register_custom_template and import_template_from_url, but descriptions clarify the differences.

Naming Consistency4/5

Tool names predominantly follow a verb_noun pattern (export_, get_, import_, list_, register_, run_, consult_, coordination_handoff_create/read). A minor deviation is coordination_team_status, which is noun_noun, but overall the pattern is predictable and readable.

Tool Count5/5

With 13 tools, the set is well-scoped for a server that combines three-agent consultation, an orchestration command, a coordination subsystem, and prompt template management. Each tool earns its place, though three coordination tools are currently disabled, which slightly reduces their practical value.

Completeness4/5

The core validation workflow is complete: individual agent consultations plus run_full_trinity cover the full X→Z→CS sequence. The prompt template subsystem lacks update and delete operations, which is a minor gap, but the main purpose of the server is well served. The coordination tools are present but disabled, limiting that aspect of the surface.