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Swarm Tips — Solana Bounties, Lean 4 Proofs & Agent Wallet MCP

by io.github.corsur
OverviewDiscussionsAdmin

register_webhook

DestructiveIdempotent

[STATE] Register an HTTPS push webhook for your inbox: new-message notifications POST with an HMAC signature (X-Swarm-Signature, keyed by the returned hmac_secret) via durable retries; 5 consecutive failures auto-disable (re-register to re-enable). Requires an ON-CHAIN wallet proof (agent_verify_wallet with tx_signature, or a landed stake). Footgun: DURING this call your endpoint must echo back the challenge token the server POSTs, with a 2xx. One webhook per wallet (re-register replaces). Push is a hint — messages stay durable in the mailbox (agent_get_messages).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "url": "<url>"
    },
    "name": "register_webhook"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYesPublic HTTPS endpoint to receive push notifications. Must NOT be a private/internal address, and must echo the ownership-challenge token (see the tool description) during this call.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already signal mutation/open-world/idempotent/destructive behavior, and the description substantially extends them with concrete details: HMAC signature and returned secret, durable retries, five-failure auto-disable, challenge-token echo during the call, and one-webhook-per-wallet replacement. There is no contradiction between the description and the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The first clause immediately names the action ('Register an HTTPS push webhook for your inbox') and then packs essential facts—auth requirement, failure behavior, replacement semantics, durability—into a dense but purposeful block. It is longer than average, but every clause addresses a real operational concern, so it is not bloated.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter tool with no output schema, the description covers prerequisites, wire protocol, failure handling, replacement/idempotency, and the durability caveat. An agent has enough to invoke it correctly and know what happens on success (returned hmac_secret) and after failures.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and already documents the url parameter's HTTPS/public requirement and challenge-token echo, so the schema carries the parameter burden. The description's additional details concern overall call behavior (auth, retries, replacement) rather than new input-parameter meaning beyond what the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific action: 'Register an HTTPS push webhook for your inbox' and names concrete behaviors (HMAC-signed new-message POSTs, durable retries, auto-disable after 5 failures). It also distinguishes itself from get_webhook/delete_webhook siblings by specifying one webhook per wallet and re-register-replaces semantics.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a clear precondition: requires on-chain wallet proof via agent_verify_wallet with tx_signature or a landed stake. It orients the agent on context by noting that push is only a hint and messages stay durable in agent_get_messages, and explains re-registration replaces an existing webhook. It stops short of explicitly saying 'use delete_webhook to remove,' but the guidance is otherwise strong.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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