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kevaremesh

Trust Identity Permission Verification 2F34

trust_identity_permission_verification_2f3437b5
Read-onlyIdempotent

Deterministically compares caller-supplied expected and observed values and reports material differences under caller-supplied verification rules. Intended for trust identity permission / result unverifiable. Do not use for legal, identity, sanctions, fraud, contractual, or regulatory adjudication. Paid resource; x402 price is $0.002 USD per call at the direct resource URL.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
expectedYes
observedYes
ignore_pathsNo
required_pathsNo
numeric_toleranceNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, openWorldHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint=false. The description adds useful context beyond those: determinism, caller-supplied verification rules, and the fact that this is a paid resource at a specific per-call price. It does not contradict the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loaded with the core comparison behavior, followed by usage boundary and pricing. Each sentence adds information, though 'Intended for trust identity permission / result unverifiable' is slightly cryptic.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given five parameters, no parameter descriptions, and no output schema, the description is not complete enough for an agent to reliably construct calls. It omits how the verification rules work, what a 'material difference' looks like in the response, and the behavior when expected and observed differ.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate for documenting the parameters. It identifies expected and observed, and alludes to 'caller-supplied verification rules', but it does not explain ignore_paths, required_paths, or numeric_tolerance, leaving their semantics and usage unclear.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific action—deterministically comparing caller-supplied expected and observed values and reporting material differences—and names the intended domain ('trust identity permission / result unverifiable'). It is clear about what the tool does, though it does not differentiate itself from the many sibling trust_identity_permission_verification_* instances.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives an explicit intended use and explicit non-uses ('Do not use for legal, identity, sanctions, fraud, contractual, or regulatory adjudication'). However, it does not name any alternative tools or explain when one of the other verification variants would be preferred.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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