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Send your signed payment to the funding door (step 3 for a buyer)

submit_funding

Finish funding a packet from your own wallet: pass the workId, your funderWallet, and xPayment — the standard X-PAYMENT header value (x402 exact scheme, an EIP-3009 USDC authorization on Base) that YOUR wallet built and signed against the challenge prepare_funding returned. This tool forwards it, unchanged, to the same public funding door any HTTP client uses (POST /nurture/fund) and returns that door's own answer. It holds no key, takes no payment itself, and marks nothing funded: the door settles the payment and only a verified settlement stamps a packet funded. Without xPayment it refuses and points you back to prepare_funding. A packet whose claim lane is closed is refused before any challenge, in plain words. If the door times out, do NOT pay again: read work_status first. Cost and signer: no payment is taken while paying Vealth is closed; when a door is open the buyer's own wallet signs and pays, and the house never holds a key.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
workIdYesThe packet id, from funding_quote or find_work.
xPaymentYesThe X-PAYMENT header value your own wallet built and signed for the exact accepts[] terms from prepare_funding. Required; this server cannot create it.
funderWalletYesThe 0x… address that signed the payment. The ADDRESS only, never a private key.
contributeUsdNoOptional. The same EXPLICIT contribution you passed to prepare_funding; it must match the amount you signed.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okNo
toolNo
fundedNo
payUsdNo
workIdNo
claimIdNo
claimableNo
next_callNo
proofRuleNo
fulfillableByNo
definitionOfDoneNo
needs_from_callerNo
notClaimableReasonNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations: it discloses that the tool holds no key and takes no payment, that the external door settles and only a verified settlement marks a packet funded, that closed claim lanes are refused before any challenge, and that the call is not safely repeatable on timeout. The duplicate-payment warning is exactly the context the idempotentHint=false annotation cannot convey on its own.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and required inputs are front-loaded in the first sentence, and each subsequent sentence covers a distinct concern (forwarding, settlement, refusal, timeout). The closing cost/signer sentence restates ground already covered earlier ('holds no key, takes no payment'), costing some tightness.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema already exists, so return values need no explanation; the description instead covers the paths an agent cannot infer — missing xPayment, closed claim lane, door timeout, and who signs and pays. Nothing needed to call this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and each parameter already documents itself, including the accepts[] linkage and the address-only rule. The description reinforces the order dependency on prepare_funding but adds little syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so the baseline applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Finish funding a packet from your own wallet') and immediately names the three required inputs. It distinguishes itself from the preparation sibling by requiring an already-signed xPayment built against prepare_funding's challenge, so an agent can tell it apart from prepare_funding and the other submit_* tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit sequencing (call after prepare_funding), explicit failure routing ('Without xPayment it refuses and points you back to prepare_funding'), and explicit when-not-to-retry guidance ('If the door times out, do NOT pay again: read work_status first'). Alternatives and the conditions selecting them are named, not inferred.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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