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influence_network_map

Read-onlyIdempotent

One-call 'follow the money and influence' map for an organization, joined across three federal public-record streams: FEC (the org's connected political committees / PACs - its political-spending vehicles), the U.S. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act (filings where the org is the client, the reported lobbying spend, the firms it hired, and the issue areas lobbied), and USAspending (federal contracts + grants the org RECEIVES, with award counts and top agencies). Returns a readable map of money flowing OUT to influence (lobbying + political committees) vs. money flowing IN from federal awards. Built for investigative journalism, govcon, and due-diligence research. Informational public-record synthesis, NOT a risk score (distinct from counterparty_risk_score). The FEC leg needs an api.data.gov key and is noted as skipped if unavailable; a source that fails is noted, not fatal.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
yearNoOptional 4-digit lobbying filing year (e.g. '2024'); defaults to the most recent year with filings.
stateNoOptional 2-letter state to scope the FEC committee search.
companyNoAlias for organization.
organizationYesOrganization / company name (e.g. 'Lockheed Martin', 'Boeing').

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint/idempotentHint annotations, the description discloses that the FEC leg requires an api.data.gov key, that a failed source is noted rather than fatal, and that the result is a synthesis rather than a scored risk assessment. This unusually specific partial-failure behavior is valuable operational context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: core value proposition, data sources, output framing, target use cases, risk-vs-synthesis caveat, and failure behavior are all covered without filler. The most important scoping information is front-loaded in the first sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a multi-source tool with no output schema, the description does an unusually good job of enumerating what each source contributes (political committees/PACs, lobbying spend/firms/issue areas, contract/grant counts and top agencies) and how failures surface. It remains slightly generic about the actual return format ('readable map'), but combined with the complete input schema, this is enough for correct selection and invocation expectations.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents organization, company, state, and year clearly. The description adds no parameter-specific syntax or constraints beyond what the schema provides, which is acceptable given the high schema coverage but means the description itself contributes little on this dimension.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly defines the tool as a one-call cross-source map for an organization and explicitly names the three federal record streams it joins: FEC, Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act, and USAspending. It also states the core output framing—money flowing OUT to influence versus money flowing IN from federal awards—and distinguishes itself from counterparty_risk_score.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit target use cases (investigative journalism, govcon, due-diligence research) and explicitly says it is an informational public-record synthesis, not a risk score, which helps differentiate it from counterparty_risk_score. It does not enumerate alternatives among other organizational-research siblings, but the context is sufficient for most selection decisions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

Many tools overlap heavily across domains: caselaw_search vs court_case_search vs court_opinion_search, caselaw_citation_lookup vs court_citation_resolver, and a cluster of company due-diligence tools (company_trust_check, counterparty_risk_score, entity_dossier, issuer_diligence_dossier, kyb_aml_evidence_case_file) that all screen a company for sanctions/risk/standing. With 290 tools, an agent will frequently face multiple equally plausible choices for the same user intent.

Naming Consistency3/5

The vast majority of tools follow a clean domain-prefix + snake_case pattern (census_, eia_, fmcsa_, npi_, cfpb_, etc.), but there are notable exceptions: entity_resolve and resolve_entity are reversed duplicates, reg_search (Federal Register) sits next to reg_cfr_search (CFR) with confusingly similar names, and carrier_monitor_recheck deviates from the carrier_vetting_* family.

Tool Count1/5

290 tools is an extreme count under any rubric, far exceeding even the 50+ threshold for the lowest score. While the group-filtering mechanism and meta-tools like list_tool_groups and search_available_datasets mitigate the practical burden, the raw surface is still massively oversized for an agent to select from accurately and efficiently.

Completeness4/5

For a read-only data-aggregation server, coverage is remarkably comprehensive across 59 domains, and generic fallbacks like cdc_dataset_query, eia_series_lookup, fred_observations, and bls_series prevent most dead ends. Minor gaps exist (a single GitHub tool, demo-only property_lookup coverage, no write/update operations anywhere), but the stated data-access purpose is well served.

Resources