FIRST EPSS exploit prediction score for a CVE. Returns probability (0-1) of exploitation in the next 30 days plus the percentile rank.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | Yes | CVE identifier. |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds value by specifying the return format (probability in 0-1 range and percentile rank) and the time horizon (next 30 days), which are behavioral details beyond annotations. No contradictions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences with no redundant information. It front-loads the purpose and clearly enumerates the return values. Every word contributes to the agent's understanding, making it highly efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter read-only tool with no output schema, the description is complete. It states what it does and what it returns, which is sufficient for an agent to call it correctly. There are no missing prerequisites or hidden complexities that require further elaboration.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The single parameter cve_id is fully described in the schema with 'CVE identifier.' The description does not add further semantics beyond what the schema provides, such as format examples or validation rules. With 100% schema coverage, a baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function: it returns the FIRST EPSS exploit prediction score for a CVE, including probability and percentile rank. This distinguishes it from other CVE-related tools in the sibling list (e.g., cve_lookup, kev_status_check) by specifying the exact metric and output.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context that this tool is for obtaining EPSS exploit prediction scores, which implies when to use it. However, it does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, so it lacks explicit exclusion guidance. The context is clear enough for an agent to infer appropriate usage.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools overlap heavily across domains: caselaw_search vs court_case_search vs court_opinion_search, caselaw_citation_lookup vs court_citation_resolver, and a cluster of company due-diligence tools (company_trust_check, counterparty_risk_score, entity_dossier, issuer_diligence_dossier, kyb_aml_evidence_case_file) that all screen a company for sanctions/risk/standing. With 290 tools, an agent will frequently face multiple equally plausible choices for the same user intent.
The vast majority of tools follow a clean domain-prefix + snake_case pattern (census_, eia_, fmcsa_, npi_, cfpb_, etc.), but there are notable exceptions: entity_resolve and resolve_entity are reversed duplicates, reg_search (Federal Register) sits next to reg_cfr_search (CFR) with confusingly similar names, and carrier_monitor_recheck deviates from the carrier_vetting_* family.
290 tools is an extreme count under any rubric, far exceeding even the 50+ threshold for the lowest score. While the group-filtering mechanism and meta-tools like list_tool_groups and search_available_datasets mitigate the practical burden, the raw surface is still massively oversized for an agent to select from accurately and efficiently.
For a read-only data-aggregation server, coverage is remarkably comprehensive across 59 domains, and generic fallbacks like cdc_dataset_query, eia_series_lookup, fred_observations, and bls_series prevent most dead ends. Minor gaps exist (a single GitHub tool, demo-only property_lookup coverage, no write/update operations anywhere), but the stated data-access purpose is well served.