Recent CVEs published in the last N days (default 7, max 120). Optional vendor and severity filters (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| days | No | Lookback window in days (1-120). | |
| limit | No | Max results (default 50). | |
| vendor | No | Optional vendor filter. | |
| severity | No | Optional CVSS severity filter: CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, or LOW. |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, openWorldHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint=false, covering safety. The description adds useful context: default lookback of 7 days, max of 120, and the valid severity levels (also in schema). No contradiction with annotations exists. It stops short of describing return format or pagination, but the added defaults and filter scope provide meaningful value beyond the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single, well-structured sentence that front-loads the core purpose (recent CVEs with time window) followed by filter options. Every clause is necessary and there is zero fluff or repetition. Highly efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is simple (0 required params, 4 optional) and annotations cover safety, but there is no output schema and the description does not mention what the response looks like (e.g., list of CVE objects), pagination behavior, or how the limit parameter affects results. For a list-returning tool, this is a notable gap, though not critical given the low complexity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so parameters are already documented. The description adds the default value for 'days' (7) and reiterates the severity options, but doesn't clarify the 'limit' default (50) or any additional formatting/syntax for vendor or severity filters. This is minimal added value over the schema, aligning with a baseline 3.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool fetches recent CVEs within a time window, with default and maximum days, plus optional filters for vendor and severity. This is specific and distinguishes from siblings like cve_lookup (exact CVE) and cve_search_by_keyword (keyword-based). The verb, resource, and scope are all explicit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for time-bounded CVE queries but does not explicitly state when to prefer it over alternatives like cve_search_by_vendor or cve_search_by_keyword. No exclusions or alternative tool mentions are given, leaving the selection to inference from the name and filters.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools overlap heavily across domains: caselaw_search vs court_case_search vs court_opinion_search, caselaw_citation_lookup vs court_citation_resolver, and a cluster of company due-diligence tools (company_trust_check, counterparty_risk_score, entity_dossier, issuer_diligence_dossier, kyb_aml_evidence_case_file) that all screen a company for sanctions/risk/standing. With 290 tools, an agent will frequently face multiple equally plausible choices for the same user intent.
The vast majority of tools follow a clean domain-prefix + snake_case pattern (census_, eia_, fmcsa_, npi_, cfpb_, etc.), but there are notable exceptions: entity_resolve and resolve_entity are reversed duplicates, reg_search (Federal Register) sits next to reg_cfr_search (CFR) with confusingly similar names, and carrier_monitor_recheck deviates from the carrier_vetting_* family.
290 tools is an extreme count under any rubric, far exceeding even the 50+ threshold for the lowest score. While the group-filtering mechanism and meta-tools like list_tool_groups and search_available_datasets mitigate the practical burden, the raw surface is still massively oversized for an agent to select from accurately and efficiently.
For a read-only data-aggregation server, coverage is remarkably comprehensive across 59 domains, and generic fallbacks like cdc_dataset_query, eia_series_lookup, fred_observations, and bls_series prevent most dead ends. Minor gaps exist (a single GitHub tool, demo-only property_lookup coverage, no write/update operations anywhere), but the stated data-access purpose is well served.