CDC NORS foodborne / waterborne / enteric outbreak reports (iezt-77pi). Returns outbreak date, state, etiology, illnesses, hospitalizations, deaths, and implicated food/exposure.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| year | No | Outbreak year | |
| limit | No | Max rows (default 50) | |
| state | No | Full state name | |
| etiology | No | Causative agent (e.g. 'Salmonella', 'Norovirus', 'E. coli') |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds the relevant data content but does not disclose behavioral details such as time range, pagination behavior, or how filters combine.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single concise sentence that front-loads the dataset identifier and immediately lists the core output fields. Every part of the sentence contributes useful information with no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only filterable query tool with fully documented optional parameters and an explicit list of returned fields, the definition provides enough context for an agent to select and invoke it correctly. The lack of an output schema is mitigated by the description enumerating the key returned attributes.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Input schema coverage is 100%, with all four parameters documented in the schema itself. The description does not add parameter-level semantics beyond what the schema already provides, so the baseline score of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names the exact CDC NORS dataset (iezt-77pi) and lists the returned fields, making the tool's purpose unambiguous. It clearly distinguishes this from the many generic CDC sibling tools such as cdc_dataset_query.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for foodborne/waterborne/enteric outbreak data through its resource name and field list, but it does not explicitly state when to prefer this over sibling CDC tools or cdc_dataset_query. No exclusions or alternative-routing guidance is provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools overlap heavily across domains: caselaw_search vs court_case_search vs court_opinion_search, caselaw_citation_lookup vs court_citation_resolver, and a cluster of company due-diligence tools (company_trust_check, counterparty_risk_score, entity_dossier, issuer_diligence_dossier, kyb_aml_evidence_case_file) that all screen a company for sanctions/risk/standing. With 290 tools, an agent will frequently face multiple equally plausible choices for the same user intent.
The vast majority of tools follow a clean domain-prefix + snake_case pattern (census_, eia_, fmcsa_, npi_, cfpb_, etc.), but there are notable exceptions: entity_resolve and resolve_entity are reversed duplicates, reg_search (Federal Register) sits next to reg_cfr_search (CFR) with confusingly similar names, and carrier_monitor_recheck deviates from the carrier_vetting_* family.
290 tools is an extreme count under any rubric, far exceeding even the 50+ threshold for the lowest score. While the group-filtering mechanism and meta-tools like list_tool_groups and search_available_datasets mitigate the practical burden, the raw surface is still massively oversized for an agent to select from accurately and efficiently.
For a read-only data-aggregation server, coverage is remarkably comprehensive across 59 domains, and generic fallbacks like cdc_dataset_query, eia_series_lookup, fred_observations, and bls_series prevent most dead ends. Minor gaps exist (a single GitHub tool, demo-only property_lookup coverage, no write/update operations anywhere), but the stated data-access purpose is well served.