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data-breach-detector

breach_timeline

Read-onlyIdempotent

Build the incident-by-incident CHRONOLOGY of one organization across every source and all history, with judgment on top: first and latest incident, incidents per year, whether the organization is a repeat victim, worst threat level and total accounts ever exposed. Those summary fields cover EVERY incident on record. The timeline list carries a window of them, oldest first within the window, defaulting to the most recent limit incidents and paging backwards with offset, so an organization with a long history shows its current state first rather than only its ancient one. Repeat victimhood is a forward-looking risk signal: organizations named more than once have demonstrably not closed the gap. Metadata only; never the leaked data. For a yes/no presence check use check_exposure.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNohow many incidents the timeline list carries (default 12); the counts, span and judgment always cover every incident
entityYesdomain, company or brand to build the chronology for, e.g. 'yahoo.com' or 'Adobe'
offsetNopages backwards through the chronology from the recent end: 0 gives the newest window, 12 gives the window before that

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint annotation, the description discloses that the tool is metadata-only ('never the leaked data'), that the timeline list carries a window (not all incidents) and how paging works, and that repeat victimhood is a forward-looking risk signal. This adds meaningful behavioral context not derivable from annotations or schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is verbose but every sentence earns its place: purpose, summary fields, timeline behavior, interpretative note on repeat victimhood, metadata-only disclosure, and alternative tool. It is front-loaded with the main action and structured logically, though slightly longer than strictly necessary.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description compensates by naming the summary fields and the timeline list structure, explaining the window and paging, and stating the metadata-only limitation. It does not enumerate every field in the incident list, but given the tool's complexity and that all parameters are documented, this is sufficiently complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema covers 100% of parameters, so baseline is 3. The description adds valuable semantics for limit and offset by explaining the paging behavior ('paging backwards with offset' and the default window), and gives examples for entity ('yahoo.com' or 'Adobe'). This enhances beyond the schema descriptions, justifying a 4.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool builds an incident-by-incident chronology for one organization across all sources, with summary judgments like first/latest incident, incidents per year, repeat victim status, worst threat level, and total accounts. It explicitly differentiates from check_exposure by directing users to that tool for yes/no presence checks, satisfying sibling differentiation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides explicit usage guidance: it explains the timeline window and paging behavior ('defaulting to the most recent limit incidents and paging backwards with offset'), notes that summary fields always cover every incident, and gives an explicit alternative for a different use case ('For a yes/no presence check use check_exposure'). This tells the agent when to use this tool vs. alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Disambiguation5/5

Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: assess_threat classifies text, breach_history searches the archive, breach_news reads recent disclosures, breach_stats aggregates statistics, breach_timeline builds per-entity chronologies, check_exposure provides a yes/no triage, and feed_sources lists metadata. Cross-references in descriptions explicitly direct users to the appropriate tool, eliminating ambiguity.

Naming Consistency4/5

Tool names are consistently lowercase snake_case and most follow a logical pattern, but not all are verb_noun (e.g., breach_history, breach_stats are nouns while assess_threat, check_exposure are verbs). The 'breach_' prefix creates a strong family, so deviations are minor and do not impair readability.

Tool Count5/5

Seven tools is ideal for this domain, covering search, news, statistics, timeline, exposure check, text classification, and source metadata without over-fragmentation or bloat. Each tool contributes a distinct capability and the set is well-scoped.

Completeness5/5

The tool surface provides comprehensive coverage of breach detection and analysis: historical search, recent disclosures, per-entity exposure checks and timelines, aggregate statistics, threat classification, and feed health checks. No obvious operational gap exists for the stated purpose.