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data-breach-detector

by io.github.beepboop2025
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breach_news

Read-onlyIdempotent

Read recent breach and ransomware DISCLOSURES from public threat-intel feeds (HaveIBeenPwned, the RansomLook live leak-site tracker and SEC 8-K Item 1.05 filings), newest first. Every row is metadata only — entity, date, scale, exposed data TYPES, threat level and source — never the leaked data, and a redaction pass strips anything credential-shaped before it is returned. Use sector to narrow to an industry keyword; for one specific organization use check_exposure; for all-time history use breach_history.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNomaximum disclosures to return (default 10; raise it deliberately, large pages are heavy for an agent loop)
offsetNohow many matching disclosures to skip before the page starts; with limit this walks a result set larger than any single page (count reports the full total)
sectorNooptional keyword filter over entity, title, summary, categories and exposed data types, e.g. 'bank', 'health', 'crypto'
sourceNooptional source filter: 'HaveIBeenPwned', 'RansomLook', 'ransomwatch-archive' or 'SEC EDGAR 8-K 1.05'
since_daysNolook-back window in days over disclosure dates (default 30)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / offset
      Added value: +{
+  "default": 0,
+  "description": "how many matching disclosures to skip before the page starts; with limit this walks a result set larger than any single page (count reports the full total)",
+  "minimum": 0,
+  "title": "Offset",
+  "type": "integer"
+}
  2. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / limit / default
      Previous value: -25New value: +10
    • changedInput schema / properties / limit / description
      Previous value: -"maximum disclosures to return (default 25)"New value: +"maximum disclosures to return (default 10; raise it deliberately, large pages are heavy for an agent loop)"
  3. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / sector / description
      Previous value: -"optional keyword filter over title, summary, categories and exposed data types, e.g. 'bank', 'health', 'crypto'"New value: +"optional keyword filter over entity, title, summary, categories and exposed data types, e.g. 'bank', 'health', 'crypto'"
    • addedInput schema / properties / source
      Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ],
+  "default": null,
+  "description": "optional source filter: 'HaveIBeenPwned', 'RansomLook', 'ransomwatch-archive' or 'SEC EDGAR 8-K 1.05'",
+  "title": "Source"
+}
  4. Changed6 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / limit / description
      Added value: +"maximum disclosures to return (default 25)"
    • addedInput schema / properties / limit / maximum
      Added value: +100
    • addedInput schema / properties / limit / minimum
      Added value: +1
    • addedInput schema / properties / sector / description
      Added value: +"optional keyword filter over title, summary, categories and exposed data types, e.g. 'bank', 'health', 'crypto'"
    • addedInput schema / properties / since_days / description
      Added value: +"look-back window in days over disclosure dates (default 30)"
    • addedInput schema / properties / since_days / minimum
      Added value: +1
  5. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations (readOnly, openWorld, idempotent), the description discloses that 'Every row is metadata only — entity, date, scale, exposed data TYPES, threat level and source — never the leaked data, and a redaction pass strips anything credential-shaped before it is returned.' This clearly explains what the tool does not return and its redaction behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single dense paragraph that front-loads the core purpose and then covers key constraints (metadata only, redaction, ordering) and usage pointers. Every sentence contributes value without redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description explains the output row composition (entity, date, scale, data types, threat level, source), ordering (newest first), and redaction. Combined with a fully self-documenting schema and sibling disambiguation, the context is complete for an agent to invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, with detailed parameter descriptions (e.g., limit default, range, 'large pages are heavy', offset semantics, sector filter scope). The description adds little new parameter semantics beyond the schema, simply reiterating the sector filter usage. This meets the baseline for high schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states it 'Read[s] recent breach and ransomware DISCLOSURES from public threat-intel feeds' and specifies the sources (HaveIBeenPwned, RansomLook, SEC 8-K). It explicitly distinguishes itself from siblings by noting 'for one specific organization use check_exposure; for all-time history use breach_history.'

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It provides explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Use sector to narrow to an industry keyword; for one specific organization use check_exposure; for all-time history use breach_history.' It also mentions offset/limit behavior in the schema descriptions, reinforcing usage context.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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