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data-breach-detector

breach_history

Read-onlyIdempotent

Search the FULL historical breach archive — every incident this server knows about, back to 2007: HaveIBeenPwned's verified breach directory, the 2020-2025 ransomwatch leak-site archive (~16k victims), the RansomLook live tracker and SEC 8-K Item 1.05 filings. Filter by keyword, year range, sector, exposed data type or minimum scale; order by date or size. Returns disclosure metadata only, never breach contents. Use this for questions like 'what were the biggest breaches of 2013' or 'which airlines have ever been hit by ransomware'.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNomaximum incidents to return (default 10; raise it deliberately, large pages are heavy for an agent loop)
orderNo'newest' (default), 'oldest' or 'largest' (by accounts exposed)newest
queryNooptional keyword over entity, title, summary, actor and data types; omit to browse the whole archive
offsetNohow many matching incidents to skip before the page starts; count can run to five figures over the ~16k-post archive, so this is how the tail is reached
sectorNoindustry keyword filter, e.g. 'bank', 'health', 'gaming'
year_toNolatest incident year to include, e.g. 2020
data_typeNorequire an exposed data type, e.g. 'passwords', 'credit card', 'health'
year_fromNoearliest incident year to include, e.g. 2013
min_accountsNoonly incidents exposing at least this many accounts

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, openWorldHint=true, and idempotentHint=true, covering mutation safety. The description adds valuable behavioral disclosures: it returns only metadata (no contents), notes that large pages are heavy for an agent loop (in the limit param), and explains offset semantics for reaching the tail of a ~16k-post archive. This goes well beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concise yet information-dense, with the core action ('Search the FULL historical breach archive') front-loaded. Every sentence earns its place: sources, filter capabilities, return-type limitation, and concrete example queries. It is well-structured and does not over-elaborate.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (9 parameters, multiple sources, no output schema), the description is remarkably complete. It covers the full date range, data sources, filter dimensions, return scope, and even performance guidance for large pages. The absence of an output schema is mitigated by 'Returns disclosure metadata only', which sets clear expectations for the agent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description provides a high-level summary of filter types ('keyword, year range, sector, exposed data type or minimum scale') and ordering ('by date or size'), but this does not add meaningful detail beyond what is already in the schema parameter descriptions. Thus, no score above baseline is warranted.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description explicitly states the tool searches the FULL historical breach archive, enumerates specific data sources (HIBP, ransomwatch, RansomLook, SEC filings), and clarifies it returns disclosure metadata only. This clearly distinguishes breach_history from sibling tools like breach_news or breach_stats by emphasizing the historical, archive-wide scope. Examples ('biggest breaches of 2013') further anchor its purpose.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear usage context with 'Use this for questions like...' and defines what it does not return ('never breach contents'). However, it does not explicitly name alternatives or state when to prefer other sibling tools, so it falls short of a 5 which requires explicit when-not/alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Disambiguation5/5

Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: assess_threat classifies text, breach_history searches the archive, breach_news reads recent disclosures, breach_stats aggregates statistics, breach_timeline builds per-entity chronologies, check_exposure provides a yes/no triage, and feed_sources lists metadata. Cross-references in descriptions explicitly direct users to the appropriate tool, eliminating ambiguity.

Naming Consistency4/5

Tool names are consistently lowercase snake_case and most follow a logical pattern, but not all are verb_noun (e.g., breach_history, breach_stats are nouns while assess_threat, check_exposure are verbs). The 'breach_' prefix creates a strong family, so deviations are minor and do not impair readability.

Tool Count5/5

Seven tools is ideal for this domain, covering search, news, statistics, timeline, exposure check, text classification, and source metadata without over-fragmentation or bloat. Each tool contributes a distinct capability and the set is well-scoped.

Completeness5/5

The tool surface provides comprehensive coverage of breach detection and analysis: historical search, recent disclosures, per-entity exposure checks and timelines, aggregate statistics, threat classification, and feed health checks. No obvious operational gap exists for the stated purpose.