SiteCheck Web Intel

Checks an IPv4 address against the Tor Project's bulk exit

security_tor_exit_nodes

Read-only

Checks an IPv4 address against the Tor Project's bulk exit list (about 1,200 active exit IPs). If it is an exit, adds the relays for that address from Onionoo: nickname, flags, country, first and last seen. Only exit IPs are on the list; a relay's other IPs are not checked. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "ip": "<ip>"
    },
    "name": "security_tor_exit_nodes"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`ip`	Yes	IPv4 address such as 171.25.193.25 (required)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`ip`	No
`relays`	No
`source`	No
`checkedAt`	No
`isTorExit`	No
`exitListSize`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4.1/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, and the description adds materially new behavior: enrichment with nickname/flags/country/first-last seen, and a pay-per-call model where only successful calls are charged. Latency, failure modes, and rate limiting are not mentioned, keeping it below 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three front-loaded sentences ordered by importance: purpose, return content, then scope caveat and pricing. Dense but each sentence carries relevant information; the pricing tail is long but operationally important.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return-shape explanation is optional, yet the description still names the enriched fields. Scope limits and cost are covered; only error/edge behavior for malformed or non-exit input is unaddressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% for the single 'ip' parameter, and the description adds only the IPv4-only constraint that is already implied by the parameter example. Baseline 3 applies since the schema does the parameter work.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Checks an IPv4 address against the Tor Project's bulk exit list') and adds the enrichment source (Onionoo) and returned fields. This clearly distinguishes it from the many other IP-reputation siblings such as security_spamhaus_zen or security_vpn_proxy_detector.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The sentence 'Only exit IPs are on the list; a relay's other IPs are not checked' gives a concrete when-not-to-trust-the-result constraint, which is genuinely useful routing guidance. It stops short of naming alternatives (e.g. broader proxy/VPN detection tools) for non-exit addresses, so it is not a full 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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