SiteCheck Web Intel

Searches abuse.ch ThreatFox for indicators of compromise

security_threatfox_iocs

Read-only

Searches abuse.ch ThreatFox for indicators of compromise matching a term (IP, IP:port, domain, URL or file hash): IOC, type, malware family, threat type, confidence, first/last seen, reporter, tags and Malpedia link. Optional exact match and a first-seen window in days. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "term": "<term>"
    },
    "name": "security_threatfox_iocs"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`days`	No	Only IOCs first seen in the last N days, 1 to 365 (default: no limit)
`term`	Yes	An IP, IP:port, domain, URL or hash to look for (required)
`exact`	No	true for exact match only (default false: partial match)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`days`	No
`iocs`	No
`term`	No
`count`	No
`exact`	No
`source`	No
`checkedAt`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4.1/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is covered; the description adds genuinely new behavior — a $0.002 USDC charge per successful call via x402 on Base/Solana/Arc, with failed calls free. That cost/auth detail is exactly the kind of context annotations cannot express, though rate limits and result caps are unmentioned.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with the core action and term types, then the pricing caveat. The return-field enumeration is somewhat listy but still earns its place by signaling what the agent gets back.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so the description needn't explain return values, and it covers input types, optional filters, and payment behavior. Only the absence of guidance on result volume or sibling selection keeps it from a 5.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so all three parameters are already documented with types and defaults. The description restates the exact-match and days-window options without adding format or edge-case detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Searches abuse.ch ThreatFox for indicators of compromise') and enumerates the accepted term types (IP, IP:port, domain, URL, hash), which cleanly separates it from siblings like security_urlhaus_malware or security_abuseipdb_check.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context for when the tool applies (IOC lookup by term, with optional exact match and first-seen window) but never names an alternative or an exclusion, so the agent must infer that URLhaus/MalBazaar/FeodoTracker cover adjacent cases.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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