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Security Talos Ip Blacklist

security_talos_ip_blacklist
Read-only

Cisco Talos reputation for an IPv4 address: threat level (favorable, neutral, poor, untrusted), web reputation score, forward/reverse DNS match, hostname, owner, location, email volume magnitude (daily, monthly and last 30 days), the /24 network's average magnitude and how many neighbouring addresses in that /24 Talos rates untrusted, poor, neutral or favorable. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
ipYesPublic IPv4 address

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
ipNo
sourceNo
dnsMatchNo
hostnameNo
locationNo
checkedAtNo
blockListsNo
last30DaysNo
contextTagsNo
emailVolumeNo
threatLevelNo
neighbours24No
organisationNo
webReputationNo
spamProbabilityNo
threatCategoriesNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover read-only and open-world semantics, and the description adds genuinely non-obvious behavioral context: a $0.002 USDC cost per successful call, the x402 payment rails (Base, Solana, Arc), and that failed calls are not charged — critical for an agent deciding whether to invoke. It stops short of stating rate limits or latency, but the payment/billing disclosure is substantial beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded in the first clause, and the pricing sentence is clearly separated and earns its place. The long enumeration of return fields is somewhat verbose and partly duplicates the existing output schema, which slightly dilutes conciseness.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, the return-field listing is redundant rather than necessary, but the pricing/payment disclosure fills a real gap. Given only one simple input parameter and rich annotations, the definition is close to complete; the main missing piece is routing guidance against sibling reputation tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single parameter with 100% schema description coverage ('Public IPv4 address'), so the schema already does the work. The description's phrase 'for an IPv4 address' merely echoes it and adds no format, validation, or scope detail (e.g. whether IPv6 or private ranges are rejected). Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb+resource (Cisco Talos reputation for an IPv4 address) and enumerates the exact data points returned, so an agent knows precisely what comes back. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from the many sibling IP-reputation tools (abuseipdb, barracuda, ipsum, spamhaus), relying on the 'Cisco Talos' source name to imply the difference.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus the crowded set of sibling reputation lookups (security_abuseipdb_check, security_ipsum_threat_level, security_barracuda_reputation, etc.). The description describes what is returned but never states when this source is preferred or what prerequisites exist.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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