SiteCheck Web Intel

Checks a certificate SHA-1 fingerprint against the abuse.ch

security_sslbl_abuse_certs

Read-only

Checks a certificate SHA-1 fingerprint (40 hex characters) against the abuse.ch SSL Blacklist of certificates seen on malware botnet C2 servers. A hit returns the date added and the malware reason from the list. Only certificates this list tracks are covered. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "sha1": "<sha1>"
    },
    "name": "security_sslbl_abuse_certs"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`sha1`	Yes	Certificate SHA-1 fingerprint, 40 hex characters (required)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`sha1`	No
`entry`	No
`listed`	No
`source`	No
`listSize`	No
`checkedAt`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4.5/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint/openWorldHint annotations, the description discloses cost ($0.002 USDC via x402, on Base/Solana/Arc), that failed calls are not charged, and what a hit returns (date added plus malware reason). Cost and billing-on-failure behavior are exactly the operational facts annotations cannot express.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences: purpose and input format first, then result semantics and coverage limits, then pricing last. No filler and every sentence conveys information an agent would otherwise lack.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter lookup with an output schema and safety annotations already present, the description covers the remaining gaps: what the list actually represents, the coverage boundary, and the payment model. Nothing needed to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single parameter already documents the 40-hex-character SHA-1 format, so the description's restatement of that format adds little. Baseline 3 applies when the schema fully carries parameter meaning.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (checks) and a precisely scoped resource (a certificate SHA-1 fingerprint against the abuse.ch SSL Blacklist of certs on malware botnet C2 servers). This clearly separates it from nearby siblings like security_ssl_cert_chain (chain inspection) or security_cert_revocation_crl (revocation status).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The scope statement 'only certificates this list tracks are covered' tells the agent when a miss is inconclusive, which is real usage guidance. It stops short of explicitly naming alternatives (e.g., feodotracker_c2 or urlhaus_malware) or saying when not to use it, so it lands one step below the top.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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