SiteCheck Web Intel

Reads a site's Referrer-Policy header and its <meta

security_referrer_policy_audit

Read-only

Reads a site's Referrer-Policy header and its tag from the home page, works out the policy a browser would apply, and rates how much of the URL it sends to other sites (strict, moderate or leaky). One GET; links on other pages can set their own policy. Related tools on this server, for a different need: security_csp_evaluator_audit when you need to read the Content-Security-Policy header of a site's home; security_bimi_record_audit when you need to read a domain's BIMI record: whether it is published. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "domain": "<domain>"
    },
    "name": "security_referrer_policy_audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`domain`	Yes	Domain name such as github.com (required)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`domain`	No
`header`	No
`rating`	No
`source`	No
`metaTag`	No
`checkedAt`	No
`httpStatus`	No
`effectivePolicy`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly=true and openWorld=true, so the description isn't carrying the safety profile. It still adds real behavioral context: a single GET, the caveat that 'links on other pages can set their own policy' (scope limitation), and the pricing model — $0.002 USDC per successful call via x402, with failed calls uncharged, which is critical pre-invocation information the schema cannot express. A rate-limit or failure-mode note would be needed for a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core behavior and its scope caveat are front-loaded in the first two clauses, and the sibling alternatives and pricing follow in a sensible order. The pricing sentence is dense with x402/Base/Solana/Arc detail but each element is decision-relevant, so nothing is clearly wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter read tool with an output schema and readOnly annotations, the description covers what is fetched, how the result is framed (strict/moderate/leaky), its scope limit, and its cost. Only minor gaps remain, such as behavior when no Referrer-Policy is present at all.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With one parameter at 100% schema coverage, the schema already defines 'domain'. The description adds modestly meaningful context by scoping the read to the 'home page', which implies the domain is used to locate a root document rather than arbitrary URLs. A 4 rather than the 3 baseline because it clarifies what part of the site is fetched.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource chain: it reads the Referrer-Policy header and <meta name=referrer> tag from the home page, computes the effective policy, and rates leakage as strict/moderate/leaky. That output vocabulary distinguishes it clearly from siblings like security_security_headers or security_csp_evaluator_audit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly routes the agent away to two named alternatives ('security_csp_evaluator_audit when you need to read the Content-Security-Policy header' and 'security_bimi_record_audit when you need a domain's BIMI record'), which is clear sibling differentiation. It never states an explicit when-to-use condition for this tool or any exclusion beyond that, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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