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Security Grey Noise Noise

security_grey_noise_noise
Read-only

GreyNoise Community lookup for an IPv4 address: whether it was seen mass-scanning the internet recently (noise), whether it is a known benign service (riot), its classification (benign, malicious, unknown), name and last-seen date. An address GreyNoise has not seen returns noise=false with a message; it is not a clean verdict. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
ipYesIPv4 address such as 185.220.101.1 (required)

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
ipNo
nameNo
riotNo
noiseNo
sourceNo
messageNo
lastSeenNo
checkedAtNo
classificationNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, so safety is covered; the description adds substantial value beyond that with the billing model ($0.002 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base/Solana/Arc, failures not charged) and the crucial behavioral caveat that a missing record is not a clean verdict. It stops short of rate limits or output shape, which the output schema covers.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the operation and its return fields, then the interpretive caveat, then cost. Three sentences with no filler; only slightly long because the payment-rails clause packs several details into one sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter lookup with an output schema, the description covers the important non-schema facts: what each signal means, how to read a negative result, and the cost/auth model. It omits failure/error modes beyond non-charging and any rate-limit or latency expectations, which is the only remaining gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single `ip` parameter is already documented with an example format in the schema. The description only restates that it takes an IPv4 address, adding no new semantics such as IPv6 rejection behavior or input normalization, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource: GreyNoise Community lookup for an IPv4 address, and enumerates exactly what it returns (noise flag, riot flag, classification, name, last-seen). An agent can distinguish it from siblings like security_abuseipdb_check or security_ipsum_threat_level because the source datastore (GreyNoise Community) is named explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied through the explanation of what noise/riot/classification mean, and the caveat that an unseen address returns noise=false with a message is genuinely useful interpretive guidance. However, it never states when an agent should prefer this over the many sibling IP-reputation tools (abuseipdb, ipsum, talos, tor exit nodes), leaving selection to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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