SiteCheck Web Intel

Reads the Content-Security-Policy header of a site's home

security_csp_evaluator_audit

Read-only

Reads the Content-Security-Policy header of a site's home page and lists weak points: 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' in script sources, bare wildcards, data: or http: script sources, a missing default-src or script-src, and a missing policy altogether. Reports directives. Header only; a CSP in a meta tag is not read. Related tools on this server, for a different need: security_referrer_policy_audit when you need to read a site's Referrer-Policy header and its <meta; security_bimi_record_audit when you need to read a domain's BIMI record: whether it is published. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "domain": "<domain>"
    },
    "name": "security_csp_evaluator_audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`domain`	Yes	Domain name such as github.com (required)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`domain`	No
`issues`	No
`source`	No
`present`	No
`checkedAt`	No
`directives`	No
`reportOnly`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover readOnly and open-world traits, and the description adds substantive behavior: header-only scope, meta-tag exclusion, the enumerated weak-point checks and directive reporting, plus billing semantics ($0.002 USDC per successful call via x402, failed calls free). That is context the agent cannot get from annotations alone.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads what is read and what counts as a weakness, then the scope caveat, then alternatives and price. Efficient overall, though the sibling-routing sentence is quite long and could be tightened without losing the routing signal.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need not be explained; the description still covers scope limits, detection list, exclusions, alternatives and cost. Nothing an agent needs in order to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single 'domain' parameter is already documented with an example, so the description need not elaborate. It adds nothing about the parameter itself, which is acceptable at baseline but not value-adding.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Reads the Content-Security-Policy header of a site's home page') plus the exact set of weakness classes it reports. It explicitly distinguishes itself from sibling audit tools, so an agent can select it without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Names two alternative siblings and the condition that selects each ('security_referrer_policy_audit when you need a Referrer-Policy header', 'security_bimi_record_audit when you need a BIMI record'). It also states a clear exclusion for this tool: a CSP in a meta tag is not read.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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