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CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

security_cisa_known_exploits
Read-only

CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (public JSON). With cveId: whether that CVE is on the list, with vendor, product, date added, federal due date, required action and ransomware-use flag. Without it: catalog size, release date and the newest additions (up to 50). Listing means exploitation was reported, not a risk score. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "security_cisa_known_exploits"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cveIdNoCVE identifier to look up (optional)
limitNoHow many newest additions to list when no cveId is given, 1 to 50 (default 10)

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cveIdNo
entryNo
listedNo
sourceNo
releasedNo
checkedAtNo
catalogSizeNo
catalogVersionNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, so the description carries the rest and does it well: it discloses the paid-call model ($0.002 USDC via x402 on Base/Solana/Arc) and that failed calls are not charged, plus the important interpretation caveat that listing is not a risk score. Remaining gaps are minor (no freshness/caching or rate-limit behavior for the catalog snapshot).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the resource identity, then the two branches, then the interpretive caveat, then cost. Every sentence carries distinct information — the pricing line and the 'not a risk score' line both earn their place — and there is no filler or repetition of the title.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-optional-parameter lookup with an output schema and readOnly/openWorld annotations, the description covers mode selection, returned fields, the interpretation caveat, and the payment model. What is missing is peripheral rather than decision-critical: catalog refresh cadence and whether repeated calls are billed/cached.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description goes beyond the schema by stating what each parameter branch actually yields — vendor, product, date added, federal due date, required action and ransomware flag for cveId; catalog size, release date and up to 50 newest additions otherwise. That ties limit's '1 to 50' to a concrete outcome rather than leaving it as a bare number.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific resource (CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog) and explicitly splits the tool's two behaviors by parameter: a single-CVE membership check with cveId, and a catalog-summary/newest-additions listing without it. An agent can tell exactly what the tool returns in each mode without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the parameter branching ('With cveId... Without it...'), which is useful, but there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance and no named alternative among the many sibling CVE tools (security_cve_nvd_lookup, security_cve_details_feed, security_epss_exploit_score). The line 'Listing means exploitation was reported, not a risk score' hints at the EPSS distinction without routing the agent to it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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