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Security Ciarmy Bad Ips

security_ciarmy_bad_ips
Read-only

Checks an IPv4 address against the CI Army (CINS Score) bad-IP list, a collective-intelligence list of addresses that recently showed hostile activity across a sensor network (about 15,000 entries). Listed means it is on the current list; the list is a snapshot. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
ipYesIPv4 address such as 1.117.61.172 (required)

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
ipNo
listedNo
sourceNo
listSizeNo
checkedAtNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover read-only and open-world semantics, so the bar is lower, but the description goes well beyond them: it discloses a per-call price ($0.002 USDC), the payment mechanism (x402 via Base/Solana/Arc), that failed calls are free, and that the list is a point-in-time snapshot of ~15,000 entries. The staleness caveat is genuinely useful for interpreting a negative result.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose and data-source scope come first, followed by the interpretation caveat and the pricing terms, with no filler. Every clause carries information the agent would otherwise have to guess at.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the description covers the remaining unknowns: input format constraint (IPv4), cost and payment flow, and result interpretation (listed = on current snapshot, not a permanent verdict). Only the absence of guidance relative to the many alternative reputation tools keeps it from being fully complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% for the single 'ip' parameter and already gives an example and the IPv4 requirement, so the description adds little parameter-level meaning. It does reinforce that only IPv4 addresses are in scope, but that is largely duplicative of the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: checks an IPv4 address against the CI Army (CINS Score) bad-IP list, and characterizes the data source (collective intelligence from a sensor network, ~15,000 entries). It is clear what the tool does, though among the many sibling IP-reputation lookups (abuseipdb, spamhaus_zen, talos_ip_blacklist, ipsum_threat_level) it does not explicitly say why to pick this list over those.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No explicit when-to-use or when-not guidance, and no mention of alternatives like the other reputation/blocklist tools in the sibling set. Usage is only inferable from the purpose statement (checking a single IP's presence on one specific list); the caller must decide on their own whether this list or another is the right one.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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