SiteCheck Web Intel

AbuseIPDB reputation for an IPv4 address over the last 90

security_abuseipdb_check

Read-only

AbuseIPDB reputation for an IPv4 address over the last 90 days: abuse confidence score (0-100), number of abuse reports, last report date, ISP, usage type and country. Needs a free AbuseIPDB key configured by the operator; reports are crowd-sourced. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "ip": "<ip>"
    },
    "name": "security_abuseipdb_check"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`ip`	Yes	IPv4 address such as 185.220.101.1 (required)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`ip`	No
`isp`	No
`isTor`	No
`domain`	No
`source`	No
`checkedAt`	No
`usageType`	No
`countryCode`	No
`totalReports`	No
`isWhitelisted`	No
`lastReportedAt`	No
`distinctReporters`	No
`abuseConfidenceScore`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4.2/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is covered; the description goes well beyond by disclosing an operator-side configuration prerequisite (free AbuseIPDB key), the crowd-sourced provenance of the data, and a billing model — $0.002 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base/Solana/Arc, with failed calls not charged. That billing and precondition detail is exactly the kind of behavior an agent cannot get from annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the purpose and time window, then the return fields, then prerequisites and pricing — a sensible ordering with no filler sentences. The enumerated return-field list is somewhat redundant given an output schema exists, which keeps it from a 5.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter lookup with both annotations and an output schema, the description covers everything an agent needs before calling: what it returns, the IPv4-only input, the auth precondition, the data-quality caveat, and the cost/charge semantics. Nothing material is left to inference.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With a single parameter at 100% schema description coverage, the schema already documents the 'ip' field and its IPv4 example, so the baseline is 3. The description adds only a mild constraint (IPv4, not IPv6) and the 90-day lookback window, which is not a parameter but does frame the result.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific verb+resource pair (AbuseIPDB reputation lookup) and a concrete scope: an IPv4 address over a 90-day window. It also enumerates the returned signal (abuse confidence score 0-100, report count, last report date, ISP, usage type, country), which distinguishes it cleanly from siblings such as security_talos_ip_blacklist, security_spamhaus_zen or security_ipsum_threat_level that also take an IP.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent can infer this is the tool for crowd-sourced IP abuse reputation, and the price note plus the 'needs a key configured by the operator' caveat give useful preconditions. However, there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance and no pointer to the many sibling IP-reputation tools (barracuda, talos, spamhaus, ipsum) that an agent would need to choose between.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All SiteCheck Web Intel tools Inspect

Try in Browser

One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources

Need Help?