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SiteCheck Agent Intel & Dev

Agent Intel Prompt Injection Firewall

agent_intel_prompt_injection_firewall
Read-only

Screens one text for prompt-injection patterns in English (instruction override, role or system-prompt extraction, jailbreak personas, hidden or encoded instructions) using a fixed rule list based on OWASP LLM01 categories. Returns HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW/NONE, each match, and the text with matches removed. A rule list misses rewording and other languages: treat NONE as no known pattern, not as safe. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
textYesThe text to screen, 1 to 20000 characters

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
noteNo
riskNo
sourceNo
matchesNo
checkedAtNo
cleanedTextNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations cover only readOnlyHint and openWorldHint; the description adds materially more: the rule-list basis (OWASP LLM01), the output verdict scale, the coverage limits (English-only, misses rewording), and the paid-call model ($0.002 USDC via x402, failed calls not charged) — a cost/auth constraint the agent must know before invoking.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, zero filler: what it does, what it returns plus the critical caveat, then price. The caveat and pricing are front-loaded rather than buried, and no sentence merely restates the name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers everything needed to call it correctly and interpret the result: input language assumption, verdict scale, match reporting, redacted-text return, known false-negative profile, and billing terms. With an output schema present, no further return-value documentation is required.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with a single well-documented 'text' parameter (1–20000 chars), so the schema carries most of the load. The description still adds a meaningful constraint not in the schema — the input is expected to be English — which affects whether the result is trustworthy.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Screens one text for prompt-injection patterns') and enumerates the four pattern families it detects (instruction override, system-prompt extraction, jailbreak personas, hidden/encoded instructions). This is clearly distinguishable from nearby siblings like scam_phishing_message_filter or pii_credentials_redaction.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit usage constraint and failure semantics: 'A rule list misses rewording and other languages: treat NONE as no known pattern, not as safe.' That tells the agent exactly how to interpret a negative result, which is the main misuse risk. It does not name alternative siblings to route to, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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