SiteCheck Agent Intel & Dev

Name screening against the US OFAC SDN list and the UN

agent_intel_ofac_sanctions_preflight

Read-only

Name screening against the US OFAC SDN list (with aliases, sanctions programs, type and addresses, via the US Consolidated Screening List API) and the UN Security Council consolidated list, returning matching entries. Optional fuzzy matching for the SDN part. It does NOT screen crypto addresses and does NOT check the EU list. A match is a lead for a human reviewer, not a legal decision. Price: $0.002 in USDC per successful call, paid with x402 (Base, Solana or Arc); failed calls are not charged.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "name": "<name>"
    },
    "name": "agent_intel_ofac_sanctions_preflight"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`name`	Yes	Person or company name, 3 to 100 characters
`fuzzy`	No	true for fuzzy SDN name matching (default false)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`note`	No
`fuzzy`	No
`query`	No
`source`	No
`ofacSdn`	No
`verdict`	No
`checkedAt`	No
`notChecked`	No
`unConsolidated`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint/openWorldHint annotations, the description discloses the priced, paid-call behavior ($0.002 USDC per successful call, x402 across three chains, failed calls not charged) and the epistemic caveat that a match is a lead for human review rather than a legal decision. Those are exactly the behavioral facts an agent needs before committing a paid, high-stakes call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The first clause front-loads what is screened and against which sources, and every following sentence carries distinct information (fuzzy scope, exclusions, legal caveat, price). It is dense and somewhat run-on in the opening parenthetical, but nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a paid, open-world screening tool with an output schema already describing return values, the description covers data sources, exclusions, optional fuzzy behavior, cost and payment mechanics, and the interpretation caveat. There is no material gap an agent would need filled before calling it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, and the description earns an extra point by clarifying that fuzzy matching applies only to the SDN portion and not the UN list, which the schema does not say. It adds no further detail on the name length or matching semantics beyond what the schema already documents.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb (name screening) and specific resources (the US OFAC SDN list with aliases, sanctions programs, type and addresses, plus the UN Security Council consolidated list), and states the return shape (matching entries). It also scopes itself out from two things it does not cover, so an agent can pick it apart from any other screening sibling without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit when-not guidance is unusually strong: it does NOT screen crypto addresses and does NOT check the EU list, which routes the agent away from a wrong tool call. What is missing is a named alternative for the EU list or address screening, so the agent knows the exclusion but not where to go instead.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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